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ABSTRACT 
In 1966 Kentucky enacted a water use regulation statute which 
makes :important modifications in the common law doctrine of riparian 
rights by authorizing the state to grant permits for the use of water. 
'Ihe permit system is primarily designed to allow the state to gather 
the information necessary to conduct long range planning studies. 
However, the permit system can also be used to appcrtion water arrong 
competing users. 'Ihe repcrt examined the comm::,n law of riparian rights 
to determine how KRS Ch. 151 had modified it and analyzed some of the 
legal prcblems which could arise in the administration of the statute. 
'Ihe standards for granting or denying a permit were examined in light 
of the purpcse of Chapter 151. Impcrtant common law modifications 
such as the abolition of the watershed limitation were considered. 
'Ihe procedural rights of applicants and third parties effected by the 
issuance of a permit were criticized because they do not prcvide an 
adequate hearing and notice prccedure. 'Ihe constitutional questions 
raised by the failure of the Chapter expressly to prctect prior vested 
rights were considered, 'Ihe repcrt concludes with an examination of 
some emerging prcblems caused by the increased use of the state's 
water for recreation. 
FCST Category VI-E 
Key Words - Legislation'', Legal aspects* , Fermi ts, Water law*, 
Riparian rights, Planning 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1966 Kentucky joined the growing list of F.astern states to partially 
abandon the riparian system and enact a comprehensive statute regulating 
water use. It has been characterized by a political scientist as having 
"strong regulatory pcwers diluted by broad exemptions111--thus it is a typical 
example of Kentucky's legislative style. Nonetheless it is an important first 
step for it provides same of the legal structure necessary for the future 
management of the state' s water resources. The purpose of this monograph is 
to describe systematically and evaluate Kentucky laws and judicial decisions 
relating to the di version, transfer, and storage of water in light of the 
state's present and future needs. 
Kentucky is a water-rich state. It has a statewide average rainfall 
2 
of 45 inches which "is reasonably well distributed over the state." Thus, 
the state has adequate streamflows and ground water supplies to meet its 
present and future needs if they are managed properly. Shortage problems do, 
however, exist. In 1930 and again in 1953 many areas of the state experienced 
severe short-run droughts3 and many areas today face this possibility because 
of inadequate carry-over storage facilities. 
Kentucky's water needs are diverse and growing. Population patterns 
4ieath, Water Management Legislation in the F.astern United States, 2 
Land and Water law Review 99, 101 (1967). 
2Department of Natural Resources, Kentucky Water Resources: 1965 
8 (1965). 
3
see, Legislative Research Commission, Water Rights law in Kentucky 
Report No. 32 2-5 (1956). 
and the projected regional role of the state will determine future demands. 
Prior to the mid-1960's Kentucky's population was virtually static because 
a high out-migration cancelled rrost of the natural increases. 4 This out-
migration has been substantially reduced because of a successful state 
industrial recruitment campaign. Substantial intra-state migration is taking 
place and the population is increasingly being concentrated in the state's 
urban areas such as Louisville, Paducah, Greater Cincinnati, Lexington, Bowling 
Green, CMensboro and Ashland. Kentucky is expected to have some three and 
three quarters million people by 1980, but will still be one of the less 
populous states in the southeast and midwest. This means that it will 
increasingly serve as an agricultural and recreation reserve for the more 
populous urbanized states to the north and west. 
These briefly are the kinds of water demands the state will face in 
the future: (1) Agriculture--Most farmers still rely on natural rainfall 
and small storage ponds but the use of irrigation is increasing, especially 
for tobacco. It is estimated that some 103. 7 billion gallons per year will 
be required by 1980. 5 (2) Industry--New industry, especially the chemicals, 
paper, and metals require large quantities of water. However, most uses are 
non-consumptive and the major problems are not quantity but the quality of 
the discharges into streams and ground water basins. 6 (3) Municipal--
The state's growing areas will require additional supplies but no long range 
shortages are forecast. 7 (4) Recreation and Fish and Wild Life--These uses 
are non-consumptive but large quantities of water are required to support 
them. Mechanisms must be created to insure minimum flows and lake levels. 
4repartment of Natural Resources, Kentucky Water Resources: 1965 
21-24 (1965). 
5rd. at 21-23. 
6rd. at 24-26. 
7rd. at 26-27. 
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With its 531 square miles of JIDuntain streams, rivers, lakes and reservoirs 
Kentucky's recreation potential is unlimited because of its proximity to 
the urban midwest and east if adequate supplies are reserved for these uses. 8 
(5) Pollution aba.tement--The use of streams to purify polluted discharges 
will oontinue for the foreseeable future although federal and state regula-
tory programs are being implemented. 
Kentucky may also serve as a source of supply for its m::ire populous 
neighbors such as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. If water becomes scarce in 
toose states, they may turn to Kentucky for additional supplies • Interstate 
compacts similar to those along the Colorado River in the West may have to 
. 9 be negotiated. 
The I:epartment of Natural Resources estimated that by 1980 Kentucky will 
oonsume 477,000,000 gallons per day in addition to the large quantities of 
. "'. h be d ,: . 10 water wuic must reserve ~or non-consumptive use. This will still not 
put a severe strain on the total am::iunt of available supply as it is estimated 
that some 12 trillion gallons of water are available each year as a result 
of natural rainfall after evaporation. 
Kentucky's abundance of natural water supply does not mean that the 
state will be without problems. The failure of cities to provide adequate 
storage facilities to augment their historic source of supply may cause 
soort-run shortages. It is often stated that resources should be managed to 
8Id. at 27-29. 
9For a discussion of the problems of allocating the supply of the 
Colorado see, Meyers, The Colorado River 19 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1966) and 
Meyers and Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 Stan. 
L. Rev. 367 (1967). 
10Id. at 18. 
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encourage their multiple use , but not all uses of water are compatible. 
The use of a reservoir for flood control storage may conflict with its 
use as a swmner playground if it is drawn down to provide water for down-
stream cities during the hot months or to provide room for winter and 
spring run-offs. 11 Systems analysis using m:xlels now being developed by 
the Division of Water may result in pressures to shift water from one loca-
tion to another in order to maximize the benefits capable of being derived 
from a limited supply and the state's legal institutions must be capable 
of responding to new criteria for allocating water in order to facilitate 
the most efficient use of the comm::mwealth's water resources. 
The Division of Water is currently developing a nl.llllber of ccrnputer 
m:xlels to study the best use of the Corrm::lnweal th' s water resources. The 
project is financed by Title III funds authorized by the Water Resources 
Planning Act of 1965. 12 One possible location scheme is suggested by the 
following excerpt from the Division's 1967 progress report: 
Water is an almost universally used resource, and is relatively 
scarce in many areas. A serious attempt must be made to allocate 
the available supply in the most efficient way possible. This 
implies the development of a quantitative method for measuring the 
value of water used in alternate ways. Other studies have utilized 
11
see Hopkins, Impacts of Recreation on ~etition for Use of 
Water, Western Resources Papers - Water, Development, Utilization, 
Conservation 151, 155 (1963). 
12Division of W3.ter, Department of Natural Resources, Water 
Resources Planning in Kentucky (1967). The Water Resources Planning 
Act of 1965 is outlined in Hart, Creative Federalism; Recent Trends in 
Water Resources Planing, 39 Colo. L. Rev. 31 (1966). 
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the concept "value added per unit of water used"* to classify 
industry types in accordance with their contribution relative to 
their water use, and that seems to offer a fruitful possibility 
here. It will not, in and of itself, answer all questions with 
respect to the best utilization of the water resource, but it 
provides a quantitative measure which may be combined with 
qualitative aspects of the problem in arriving at allocation 
and planning decisions. Once these values have been determined, 
it is possible to combine them with information relative to the 
geographical dispersion of industry within the state and thus 
to estimate the regional consequences of shifts in final demand 
for products produced anywhere within the state. The importance 
of the concept for planning is obvious. In areas of actual or 
potential water shortage the push for increased industrialization. 
should be in the direction of those industries where the ratio 
is high--i.e., where value added per unit of water use is great. 
In areas where there is an actual or potential water shortage and 
where there is an established industry showing high value added 
per unit of water used, then rich rewards await increased availability 
of water resources. 
However, it should be noted that value added per unit of water 
used is not the same thing as the =ginal revenue productivity 
of water in the industry's technology. Value added per unit of 
* Value added is used here in the technical sense. That is, for 
a given industry, value added is equal to the total market value 
of its output less the value of intermediate goods it uses as 
inputs. 
- 5 -
water in the industry will be large whenever the numerator of the 
13 
ratio is large in oomparison with the denominator. 
13Id. at 41-42. 
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Chapter II 
THE COMMON I.AW OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
Kentucky does not have a well-developed corrm:m. law of water rights 
reflecting the absence of substantial use conflicts during m::ist if its 
history. The state's early water problems were centered around the elim-
ination of health hazards caused by swamps and the improvement of navi-
gation on the Ohio River and its tributaries rather than conflicts am:ing 
conswrrptive users. For example, lDuisville was known as the graveyard 
of the west and a mecca for doctors after it was plagued by a series of 
. . . h Oh" . l4 A . . epidemics caused by its swamps along t e io River. public drainage 
program was started in 1811 and the hazard was eventually eliminated. 
A canal company was formed in 1835 to dig a canal around the Falls of the 
Ohio which impeded navigation on the river. 15 The important conflicts 
of the recent past have been ones of pollution, principally between coal 
miners and downstream riparians, and surface drainage. These problems 
will not be covered in this report except as they relate to the allocation 
and distribution of water. These examples serve only to illustrate the 
focus on the state's natural resource problems which predominated during 
its early history and to serve as a contrast to the kinds of problems the 
state lll3.Y face in the future. 
The COIIIllOn law of riparian rights is stiil.l important,. however, 
14t.Jade, The Urban Frontier 87 (1959). 
15Id. at 137. 
- 7 -
because several elements of it have been incorporated into K.R.S. Ch, 151. 
The canm:m law distinction between water flowing or standing in a natural 
water course and diffused surface water is the basis of the Division of 
Water's regulatory jurisdiction. 
preference for riparians as well 
K.R.S. 151.210 preserves the domestic 
16 
as other rights. Thus, an understanding 
of K.R.S. Ch, 151 must start with a brief discussion of the Kentucky comoc,n 
law of riparian rights. 
History of Riparian D:lctrine in Kentucky 
Kentucky has followed the doctrine of riparian rights rather than 
the western doctrine of prior appropriation. Riparian rights attach to 
those who own land adjacent to a natural stream or watercourse, as one 
commentator explained it, "simply by virtue of his ownership of land. 1117 
The riparian right was conceptualized as an incident to the adjoining 
property, thus the rights passed with a grant of riparian land regardless 
of whether they were specifically conveyed. 18 Further, the right was 
neither lost by nonuse nor were any acts of intention to use or actual 
use required to perfect a riparian right. The right could be asserted 
whenever the downstream riparian decided that he was threatened by the 
use being rrade of the water by the upstream riparian. 
The doctrine of riparian rights has historically been considered 
a branch of the law of real property. This has led to a rigid view of the 
right and forms that basis for the frequently asserted claim that any 
public interference with the right would be a taking of private property 
16 K.R.S. 151.120(1) (1966). 
17The Comronwealth of Massachusetts, Legislative Research Council 
Report: Rights to Surface and Subsurface Waters in Massachusetts 18 (1957). 
18clark, ed. Waters and Water Rights 53.4 (1967). 
- 8 -
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for which compensation must be paid. However, the position that the laws 
governing the use of land should govern the use of water are untenable 
in light of the history of the common law as it developed in England and 
the United States. 
The English common law developed during an era when water use con-
flicts were not serious and there was little attempt to formulate a 
functional theory of water rights. The English courts frequently announced 
that rule that "every man has a right to have the advantage of a flow of 
water in his = land without diminution or alteration," except as one 
. h . . . . h 19 mig t acquire a prescriptive rig t. Thus, the first user on the stream 
might gain all the water or a downstream riparian might be able to enjoin 
all upstream use without showing any injury by the upstream use but this 
doctrine was never applied to its logical conclusion but the important 
fact for an understanding of American water law is that it was not accepted 
by American scholars during the time when the American common law or 
. . . be' 20 riparian rights was ing developed. 
The two leading American scholars who developed the American corrunon 
law are Justice Story and Chancellor Kent. The test adopted by Justice 
Story and promulgated by Kent in his Commentaries was derived both from 
19 
Bealey v. Shaw 6 Ea.st 208, 102 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1805). In the case 
an upstream mill owner enlarged his sluice which reduced the flow avail-
able to the downstream CMner. The court held for the downstream mill 
owner on the theory that he had been the first to use the water, although 
he had not used it for the prescriptive period, and thus was entitled to 
an injunction. The English court in effect applied the doctrine of prior 
appropriation rather than the natural flow theory. 
20The history of the doctrine is admirably discussed in lauer, The 
Co=n law Background of the Riparian D:lctrine, 28 Mo. L. Rev. 60 (1963), 
and lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, Water Resources and the law 
133 (1958). 
- 9 -
the civil law. 21 The civil law, developing, from Roman law had never been 
burdened with the tension between the absoluteness of private property 
rights in land and the difficulty of applying these concepts to water. 
The civil law, as reflected in the Code Napoleon of 18 04 , gave each 
riparian on the stream a co-relative right to use the water. Adjustments 
were to be determined by the facts of the individual case. The English 
ccmoon law had been struggling toward this position but had never clearly 
conceptualized the development. Story recognized the potential economic 
absurdity of the English cOIIlllOn law and turned instead to the French Law 
and its Roman origin because of their emphasis on the correlative rights 
of each user along the stream. 
Kentucky's first case adopted Justice Story's reasonable use theory, 
although latter cases fumbled around conceptually before returning to a 
clear enunciation of it. The leading Kentucky case on the law of riparian 
rights is Anderson v. Cincinnati Southern Railway. 22 Plaintiff operated 
a grist mill over a stream and defendant built a nine foot high dam up-
stream to store water for its trains which diminished the flow of the 
stream causing the mill to stop. The court stated the basic premises of 
riparian law: (1) every proprietor of lands along the banks of streams 
has an equal and usufructory right to the water while it passes his land, 
(2) the law distinguishes between domestic and artificial uses. The land 
owner may use all the water necessary to supply his domestic needs but 
he is limited to a reasonable and proportionate share of the water necessary 
for artificial uses. The court found that supplying railroad trains was a 
21
see Wiel, Waters: American and French Authority, 33 Harv. L. 
Rev. 133 (1919). 
2286 Ky. 44 (1887). 
- 10 -
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reasonable but artificial use of the water and stated that the relevant 
inquiry was "whether its use for the purposes the railroad injured the 
mill below." The court held that plaintiff would be entitled to an 
injunction if he proved injury. Anderson is a straightforward and correct 
application of the reasonable use standard but the opinion caused considerable 
conceptual ccnfusion for subsequent courts because the court originally 
dropped the phrase that "every proprietor ..• has naturally an equal 
right to the use of the water which flows in the stream adjacent to his 
. . . . . . . 23 lands, as it is wont to run without dimunition or alteration." Although 
this was immediately contradicted by the next sentence which said "No 
proprietor has a right to use the water to the prejudice of other pro-
prietor above or below him, unless he has a prior right to divert it, or 
a title to some exclusive enjoyment. 1124 The natural flow theory was fur-
thur rejected when the court emphasized that recovery could not be had 
on a simple showing of upstream diversion but that there had to be a showing 
of diversion plus injury. 
In J<rawler v. Smith, 25 a 1915 decision, a distillery was polluting 
a stream by discharging .slop. A lower riparian sued and was granted an 
injunction on the sanewhat garbled theory that the riparian is "entitled 
to the natural flow of the water, unimpaired in quality, except as may be 
occasioned by reasonable use of the stream by other proprietors" but the 
court did emphasize the need to show substantial injury before an injunction 
cculd be granted, so it is clear they were applying the reasonable use theory. 
23
rd. at 48. 
24rd. at 48-49. 
25154 Ky. 674, 177 S.W. 286 (1915). 
- 11 -
In 1949 the court of appeals was still unsure of which theory it had 
adopted. In City of lDuisville v. Tway26 defendant damed a creek which 
impeded its flow and plaintiff lower-riparian alleged that this aggravated 
the stream's pollution condition because the velocity was no longer suffi-
cient to flush the stream. The lower riparian naturally urged the natural 
flow theory and the court surprisingly agreed saying, "it is true that, as 
suggested by council, that our court is comnitted to the natural flow theory" 
but then said it made little difference which theory applied as no injunction 
oould issue unless a substantial showing of injury was made. The court's 
opinion about the consequences of the tv.D theories shows complete confusion 
but the result indicates that the reasonable use theory was always the 
law in Kentucky. 
The confusion in the Kentucky cases was eliminated in 1954 when the 
. . . 27 legislature enacted a statute codifying the reasonable use rule. K.R.S. 
262.690(1) limited the riparian to the amount of water reasonably necessary 
to meet his needs. The danestic preference was retained but language 
intended to limit ±ts application was included. 28 
use 
There have been few cases which have defined the concept of reasonable 
in Kentucky. 29 Most of these have dealt with the right of the upper 
26297 Ky. 565, 108 S.W. 2d 278 (1949). 
27Kentucky 1 s 1954 water law statutes were modeled after similar 
enactments in Virginia. See Note, A Comparative Analysis of Kentucky 
Water Law 43 Ky. L. J. 504 (1954). 
28K.R.S. 262.690 (1) limited water for domestic use to "household 
purposes, drinking water for livestock, poultry, and domestic animals." 
29ror a discussion of the reasonable use doctrine see Murphy, A 
Short Course on Water Law for the Eastern United States, 1961 U.L.Q. 
93, 96-102, 109-10. 
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30 
riparian to discharge unwanted 
31 
or polluted water to the detriment 
of the lower riparia~. 'Ihese situations deal with activities by the upper 
riparian which are not compatible with the lower riparian and if the lower 
riparian is to be protected the upper riparian JlUlSt either be prohibited 
from carrying on his activity or be compelled to pay damages to the lower 
riparian. 'Ihe courts have devised no consistent set of criteria to deter-
mine if a given use is reasonable. They have relied both on categories 
of uses which are uniformly tmreasonable, such as pollution, and on the 
proposition that no use can be classified as unreasonable except in the 
context of the use with which it conflicts. There have been few Kentucky 
30 See, e.g., Crabtree Coal Minip.g Co. v. Bamby's Adm'r, 28 Ky. 
90 s.w. 226 (1906). 
31 See, e.g., Inland Steel v. Isaacs, 283 Ky. 770, 143 S.W.2d 
503 (1940). 
3laCompare Crabtree Coal Mining Co. v. Bamby's Adm'r, 28 Ky. 687, 
90 S.W. 226 (1906) with North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 224 Ky. 639, 51 
S.W.2d 960 (1932). Both cases involved conflicts between the holder of 
the surface estate and the holder of mineral rights who was alleged to 
have damaged the surface estate by pollution. In Crabtree the court 
held for the surface owner on the theory that the c~any had a right 
to use the stream "in a reasonable degree but it may not materially 
alter its quality. " The court' s reasoning mixes both the reasonable use 
and~ se unreasonable theories of pollution but its tone indicates that 
it considered substanti~ pollution unreasonable~ se. In North-East 
Coal Co., the court applied a reasonable use analysis to the right of 
the mineral owner to pollute the surface owner's water supply as part of 
his mining operations , saying that the holder of the minerals would be 
liable for pollution only if the damage could have been avoided by 
"ordinary care" or "reasonable expense" on his part. 
31bsee Lauer, 'Ihe Riparian Right as Property, supra note at 196. 
3lcAnderson v. Cincinnati Southern .!sz· Co., 86 Ky. 44 (1887) (diversion) 
and City of Louisville'!.:._ Tuay 297 Ky. 565,108 S.W.2d 278 (1949) 
( impoundment) . 
- 13 -
cases where the reasonable use rule has been applied to allocate water 
between two or rrore riparians who desire to use rrore water than the stream 
can supply by decreeing mutual curtailment of their present manner of 
use. The Court has only rejected the two m:,st inefficient consequences 
of the natural flow theory. The strict comnon law view was that both 
diversions and :irrq;,oundments were unreasonable per se. These views have 
been explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals in favor of the m:,re 
rational position that these uses can only be held unreasonable in the 
context of other canpeting uses. The court of appeals has in dictum, 
rowever, adopted a general formulation of the reasonable use rule. In 
Is.ughtery v. City of Lexington32 plaintiff desired to construct a m:>tel 
and restaurant on riparian land above the city of Lexington's reservoir. 
The city of Lexington denied the necessary building permit and the court 
of appeals sustained the denial because plaintiff failed to allege his 
sewage disposal system would not endanger the purity of the public water 
supply. Defendant argued that he was entitled to lIBke reasonable use of 
his property as a riparian and argued that his proposed use would be reason-
able. In the course of its opinion the court quoted from a Michigan case 
which defined reasonable use in the following terms. In the course of the 
opinion the court quoted with approval from a Michigan case33 which said 
"But in determining whether a use is reasonable we must consider what the 
use is for, its extent, duration, necessity, and its application; the nature 
and size of the stream, and the several uses to which it is put ; the extent 
of the injury to the one proprietor and of the benefit to the other; and 
32 249 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1952). 
33People v. Hurbert, 131 Mich. 156, 170, 91 N.W. 211, 217 (1902). 
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all other facts which may bear upon the reasonableness of the use." 
Vague as this formulation is, it does give some indication of the factors 
a court would use in making an allocation of a stream between competing 
riparians. 
DEFINTIION OF A WATER COURSE 
The common law attached different consequences to different categories 
of water. The two major classifications were: Cl) diffused surface water, 
and ( 2) water flowing in a natural stream or standing in a watercourse such 
as a lake. The former was considered the property of the owner of the land 
. 34 Th on which they were found. e latter were the oommon property of all 
land owners adjacent to the stream and allocated by the doctrine of riparian 
rights. 
The difference between the two basic classifications is buried in 
history and a full historic examination of the development of these doctrines 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Their primary m::x:l.ern importance is 
that they serve to define the Division of Water's jurisdiction. K.R.S. 
151.120 limits the Division's jurisdiction to public water which is defined 
as "Water occuring in any stream, lake, ground water, subterranean water, 
or other body of water in the Commonwealth which may be applied to any 
useful and beneficial purpose " Diffused surface water is not public 
water "and the owner of land on which such water falls shall have a right 
to its use." 
K.R.S. 151.100(5) defines diffused surface water as "that water 
which comes fran falling rain or melting snow or ice, and which is diffused 
34c1ark, ed., Waters and Water Rights, section 52l(A) (1967). 
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over the surface of the gn:iund, or which t~rarily flows vagrantly upon 
or over the surface of the gn:iund as the natural elevations and depressions 
of the surface of the earth may guide it, until the water reaches a stream or 
watercourse." K.R.S. 151.100(4) defines a stream or watercourse as "any 
river, creek or channel having well defined banks, in which water flows 
for substantial periods of the year to drain a given area, or any lake or 
any other l:xxly of water in the Comnonwealth." It is not clear whether 
K.R.S. 151.100(4)-(5) merely incorporates c011BIOn law or attempts to sub--
stitute a rrore narrow definition of watercourse. The comn::,n conception 
of a natural watercourse is a stream flowing in a definite channel with 
lak . 1 f" 35 Th . ' . a bed and banks or a e J.n wel de J.ned bed. e COl!BIOn law defJ.n1.t1.on, 
however, is much broader. 36 K.R.S. 151.100(4) could be read to limit the 
Division's jurisdiction by not incorporating the many cases which have 
held various types of flood waters which had left their normal channel to 
be still flowing in a watercourse and thus subject to the doctrine of ripar-
ian rights. 
The leading Kentucky decision on the definition of a watercourse is 
37 · Morgan~· Morgan. Defendant sought to build a roadway across Twin Creek 
which separated his land from plaintiff's. Plaintiff sued for damages 
alleged to have resulted from the deposit of rocks and metal beneath the 
roadway. The main issue was whether defendant was entitled to an easement 
of necessity. The Court of Appeals held he was but desired to limit its 
35
c1ark, ed., Waters and Water Rights section 52.l(B) (1967). 
36rd. at section 52.l(B). 
37 205 Ky. 545, 266 S.W. 35 (1924). 
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scope to protect pla:intiff from any flooding which might result from obstruc-
t:ing a natural stream as his road would be built over the highwater mark. 
Thus, it became necessarry if the fill was placed :in a natural stream :in 
order to detennine if it was entitled to protection as a riparian. The 
court held that pla:intiff could compel the removal of the obstructions if 
she could prove probable :injury because they were placed with:in the boundaries 
of a natural stream. It defined a stream as follows: 
"A 'watercourse' in the legal sense of the term does not 
necessarily consist merely of the stream as it flows with:in 
the banks which form channel in ord:inary states of water. 
When, :in time of ord:inary high water, the stream, extending 
beyond its banks, is accustomed to flow down over the adjacent 
lowlands in a broader, but still def:inable stream, it still has 
the characteristic of a watercourse, and the law relat:ing to water 
courses is applicable, rather than that relat:ing to mere surface 
water." 38 
Morgan illustrates that the hydrologic problems which will give the 
court the most trouble in def:ining the Division's jurisdiction will result 
from flooding and overflow situations. It is difficult to define at what 
point waters which rise above the normal level of the stream cease to be 
water flowing in a natural stream or watercourse and become diffused sur-
face waters. There are two criteria the courts use (1) the area covered 
by the flow, and (2) the continuity and frequency of the flow. It is clear 
that at common law water does not automatically become diffused surface 
water when it leaves the normal channel. If the court finds that there is 
38 266 S.W. at 36. 
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an =a which is regularly subject to flooding or overflows, it has often 
been held that this constitutes a natural stream or watercourse. 39 The 
question is obviously one of degree and the court is less likely.to make 
this finding as the water spreads farther away from its normal channel. 
If the overflow is limited to a section of the stream,. the court is less 
likely to classify the water as diffused than if the water never returns 
to the normal channel or fonns a channel with definable banks. For example, 
in a recent California case40 defendant impounded what he alleged to be 
diffused surface waters. Plaintiff, a downstream riparian, sued alleging 
interference with his rights claiming that the waters were part of a stream 
system. The court held that the defendant was entitled to the waters because 
they did not enter the reservoir by a well defined channel or watercourse 
and thus were diffused surface waters. 
The definition of a watercourse adopted by the court of appeals in 
l-brgan could be held to be precluded by K.R.S. 151.100(4). Morgan holds 
that a stream can be a watercourse when it leaves its banks if the flow lll3.i.ri-
tains a definite course, while 100(4) could be read to confine the corrmission's 
jurisdiction to water within the banks of the stream. Flood water could thus 
be captured without the necessity of obtaining a permit from the Division. 
If K.R.S. 151.100(4) is narrowly read the Division will be deprived 
of jurisdiction over a potentially large source of water. There is evidence 
that the legislature did not intend to substitute a new definition for 
39Macanber v. Godfrey, 108 Mass. 219 (1871) discussed in Ccmronwealth 
of Massachusetts, legislative Research Council Report relative to Rights 
to Surface and Sub-Surface Water in Massachusetts 29 (1957). 
40South Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist. v. Johnson, 
231 Cal. App.2d 388, 41 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1964). 
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the common law definition of water course. K.R.S. 151.120(1) and (2) 
appears to create two classes of water,public and private. Diffused 
surface water is private and is defined as "water which flows Vagl'.'antly 
over the surface of the ground .•. 11 This appears to 1:e a codification 
of the ocmmon law definition, while public water is water flowing or standing 
in a watercourse as defined by K.R.S. 151.100(4). If 151.100(4) is not 
read to incorporate the broadest camroc,n law definition of watercourse, 
Ch. 151 creates three classes of water, public, private, and flood waters 
subject to the doctrine of riparian rights. There is no evidence that the 
legislature intended to this result. Rather it is more logical to assume 
it intended to substitute allocation by permit for the riparian system 
except where the common law was specifically retained in K. R. S. 151.120. 
Either K.R.S. 151.100(4) should 1:e construed by the courts to incorporate 
the common law definition of a watercourse or it should 1:e amended to do 
so. 
Too other frequently litigated issues are (1) the point at which a 
watercourse 1:egins , and ( 2) the frequency of the flow required to constitute 
a watercourse. In Kentucky the issues will often arise to determine if 
the flow of a series of springs has 1:ecome a natural stream. For example, 
in Winters v. Berea College the college erected a dam across its land at 
the location of five underground springs. A riparian on a stream 1:elow the 
dam site sued alleging interference with her rights and it 1:ecame necessary 
to classify the water. The court held that riparian had the burden of 
proof and that the evidence failed to prove the existence of a watercourse. 
41 349 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1961). 
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It showed only that there was a hollow below the dam which had a few pot 
holes which contained water after a rain" The absence of any showing of 
periodic flow down the hollow seems to be the basis for the court's holding. 
In the course of its opinion it defined the conmencement of a watercourse 
as follows: 
"It has been stated that surface water becomes a natural 
watercourse at the point where it begins to form a reasonably well-
defined channel, with a bed and banks, or sides and current, 
although the stream itself may be very small and the water may not 
flow continuously. So, while the term 'water course' does not 
ordinarily include water descending from hills, down rollows and 
ravines , only in times of rain and rnel ting snow, yet where water, 
owing to the hilly and rrountainous configuration of the country, 
accUIIllllates in large quantities from such courses, and at regular 
seasons descends through long, deep gullies or ravines on the 
land below, and in its onward flow carves out a distinct and well-
defined channel, which bears the unmistakable irrqiress of the frequent 
action of running water, and through which it has flowed from time 
immemorial, such stream constitutes a water course and is governed 
42 
by the rules applicable thereto "56 Pm. Jur. 498 (Water 8). 
The issues in these cases will be more factual than legal. The 
doctrines ennunciated by the courts can only provide future courts and 
administrators with rough guidelines. Precise definitions can only come 
through case by case adjudications of concrete problems. 
42Id. at 358. 
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There is a need to re-examine the utility of incorporating COJlllIDn 
law classifications into Ch. 151. The classification of waters should 
be based on the nature of the claim asserted against them rather than on 
historic distinctions which have become artificial. Historically diffused 
surface water was considered a liability and not an asset. It was some-
thing to be gotten rid of before it did extensive damage to the surface 
LJ.3 
of one's property.· Thus, the rules governing its use (discussed infra) 
are designed to adjuciate property damage claims by fixing liability between 
landowners rather than to allocate a scarce resource. It has been frequently 
stated by the courts in dictum that the upper riparian can impound all the 
diffused surface water flowing across his land regardless of the detriment 
suffered by a lower riparian although no Kentucky case so holds. 44 This 
rule will be unsound as diffused surface water increasingly becomes an 
important source of water supply and must be allocated am::,ng competiting users. 
It should, however, be noted that considerable coordination can presently 
be achieved through judicial or administrative use of the elastic definitions 
of natural stream or watercourse. Large quantities of flood water are 
potentially subject to public regulation if the Division of Water follows 
the lead of the Court of Appeals and broadly interprets the meaning of 
natural stream or watercourse. 
Chapter 151 should be amended to achieve the coordination of all 
potential sources of water supply. The Model Water Use Act includes the 
following provision designed to achieve hydrologic coordination: 
43The comnon law doctrines are extensively discussed in Iblson, 
Diffused Surface Water and Riparian Rights: Legal Doctrines in Conflict, 
1966 Wis. L. Rev. 58. 
44For a discussion of the comnon law rule see Maloney and Flager, Diffused 
Surface Water: Scrouge or Bounty? 8 Natural Resources J. 72, 108-111 (1968). 
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After the effective elate of this Act, no reservoir, dam, 
embankment, pond, or other device or structure for impounding 
or collection of diffused surface waters where the arrount of 
water so impounded or collected exceeds [ ]acre-feet may be 
constructed or established unless a permit has been obtained 
from the Carrunission. The Carrunission is authorized to issue 
. . . 45 general and specific permJ.ts. 
The comnents following the section give the foliowing reason for 
the coordination. 
In order to secure intelligent management of the uses of 
the waters of the state and to avoid interference with these 
uses when made in accordance with the Act, it is necessary for 
the Commission to have power over all water resources which 
reasonably could cause interference with uses sanctioned by 
the Act. This section recognizes the scientifically established 
fact that all waters whether above, upon, or beneath the earth 
are part of one hydrological cycle and that an interference 
with one phase of the cycle affects other phases. Specifically, 
an interference with the flow of diffused surface water affects 
the flow of streams and lakes since great arrounts of water 
found in these collected bodies reach them in the form of 
diffused surface water. By giving the Commission control 
over any substantial interference with the flow of diffused 
surface water, the plans of the Carrunission for develoµnent 
of the waters of the state under the permit system will be 
45 Model Water Use Act 402 (1958). 
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secure. Further, conflicts which may arise between users of 
stream and lake supplies and users of diffused surface supplies 
can be avoided by allowing the Commission power to plan and 
regulate all the waters of the state. 46 
The reasons are sound and KRS 151.120(2) should be amended to provide 
that a person wishing to impound or divert diffused surface waters must 
. 47 
secure a pe:rnut. 
DEFillITION OF RIPARIAN 1AND 
It is axiorratic that riparian rights attach only to riparian lands. 
The generally accepted definition of a riparian owner is that "A riparian 
owner is an owner of land bounded by a watercourse or through which a 
stream flows, and generally only such an owner may claim or exercise 
riparian rights which are those rights which actually touch on the water--
48 
course or through which the watercourse flows." This definition is 
incorporated into K.R.S. 151.210, discussed infra, which gives certain 
preferences and rights to owners of land contiguous to a public stream. 
The definition of a watercourse has been previously discussed and 
often it will be necessary to find the existence of a watercourse before 
it can be determined if the land is riparian. 
It is generally accepted that riparian land must be within the 
watershed of the stream if the diversion threatens the reasonable uses 
46 Model Water Use Act 402 COJJIUent (1958). 
47Iowa and Mississippi have enacted coordination statutes. T'ne 
right to use diffused surface waters is conditioned on the maintenance of 
an average minimum flow for downstream users. Iowa Code 455A.27 (Supp. 
1964) and Miss. Code Ann. 5956-02(i) (1958). 
48Pmnstrong v. Westroads Development Co., 380 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1964). 
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being rrade by riparians within the watershed. 49 
The division of a tract of land into tracts which are no longer 
contiguous to the stream destroys the riparian right under the California 
rule50 but not under the Oregon rule. 51 The California rule is that "The 
riparian right extends only to the Slll3.llest tract held under one title 
in the chain of title leading to the present owner." The person purchasing 
a non-riparian segment of a riparian tract can, of course, protect himself 
52 
by purchasing water rights fram the riparian at the time of the transfer. 
It is probable that the Court of Appeals will adopt the California 
rule if called on to decide the question although neither K.R.S. 151 nor 
the cases require that result. K. R. S. 151. 210 speaks of an owner or 
owners of land contiguous to public water but does not clearly specify 
if the section applies only those presently owning contiguous land. It 
would be reasonable to asswne that "presently" is :implied for the non-
contiguous owner rray obtain a permit to divert water to non-contiguous 
lands if he has not obtained rights by a prior transfer. 
RIGHTS TO GROUND WATER 
Ground water is a source of water supply in all parts of Kentucky 
but its t= principal areas of use are the Ohio River Valley strip and 
the Jackson Purchase. Its use is still Slll3.ll compared to surface water 
but it is expected to increase as IIRlIU.cipalities and industries increasingly 
49Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978 (1907). 
50Boehmer v. Big Rock Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 1+8 Pac. 908 (1897). 
51Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 61+ Pac. 855 (1901). 
5211:x:lern cases hold that riparian rights rray be served fram the land 
and sold, Mianus Realty Co. v. Greenway, 151 Conn. 128, 193 A.2d 713 (1963), 
but the non-riparian transferee is subject to the rule of reasonable use. 
State v. Apfelbacher, 167 Wis. 233, 167 N.W. 21+1+ (1918). 
- 21+ -
r· 
[ . 
I 
[ 
L 
L 
L 
L 
rely on wells for their supply. It is unlikely that Kentucky will ever 
experience the severe over-draft problems which have plagued central 
Arizona and portions of California. However, as the use of ground water 
increases, pumping in excess of the safe annual recharge may occur in 
portions of the state and it will be necessary to adjudicate conflicts 
among competing users. 
Kentucky has never enacted legislation dealing specifically with 
ground water. 'Those conflicts which have arisen have been resolved by 
the common law. Chapter 151 includes "ground water" within the definition 
of public water but has no special provisions to regulate the drilling 
and management of wells. 'The m:,st serious problems are pollution of ground 
water supplies and certain aspects of this problem are covered by other 
legislation. For example, any person desiring to drill or deepen, reopen 
a plugged well for purposes of fluid injection for the production of oil 
and gas must obtain a pennit from the Director of Oil and Gas Conservation 
• . 53 . in the Department of Mines and Minerals. Pollution of the ground water 
supply is a factor to be considered by the Director in the issuance of the 
pennit and the condition attached to it. 
'The term "ground water" has no precise meaning for the hydrologist as 
it had for the common law. 'The common law classified "ground water" into 
two categories : (1) percolating waters and ( 2) water flowing in underground 
streams. 'The consequences of the classification were that percolating 
water was held to be the private property of the overlying owner and thus 
subject to his exclusive use. Water flowing in an underground stream was 
governed by the law of riparian rights. 
53 
K.R.S. 353.570 et. seq. (1960). 
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These categories have long been criticized by hydrologists and legal 
scholars as artificial because they are unrelated to scientific fact. The 
basic criticism is that they ignore the interrelationship between surface 
and subsurface systems and thus frustrate management programs designed to 
coordinate the development of a watershed. Thomas and wna summarize the 
defects in.the common law classificatory system as follows: 
"Yet it is clear that this isolation can only be main-
tained only when and where water is being mined frcm underground 
storage. Any water pumped from wells under equilibrium con-
ditions is necessarily diverted into the acquifer from some-
where else, perhaps from. other acquifers, perhaps from streams 
and lakes, perhaps from wetlands, ideally, but not necessarily, 
from places where it· was of no use to anyone. There are 
enough examples of streamflow depletion by ground-water 
development and of ground water pollution from wastes released 
by surface waters, to attest to the close though variable 
54 
relation between surface water and ground water." 
Gruund water basins are generally managed to balance the rate of 
withdrawal against the.rate of recharge so that an optimum time distri-
bution can be achieved and present needs balanced against future needs. 
The period used to determine equilibrium conditions varies. 55 A yearly 
54Piper and Thomas. Hydrology and Water: What is Their Future 
CorrJIDn Ground? Water Resources and the Law, 7 12 (1958). 
55rd. at 11-13. 
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period is generally used and ground water is considered·being "mined" --
the depletion of a stock resource--if the annual rate of withdrawal exceeds 
the 56 . 'od be annual rate of recharge. However, longer tune peri s may used, 
if withdrawals are coordinated with the use of other sources of water. 
For example, it has been proposed that the State of California manage the 
ground water basins in Southern California so that they would be drawn 
down during dry cycles and replenished during years of excess run off, 
Proposed management programs such as this illustrate the need to coordinate 
the laws governing allocation of ground water with those governing the 
allocation of surface water in order to maximize the efficiency of the 
program. 
The Kentucky comnon law was what is known as the "American rule" of 
ground water. The first case Nourse v. Andrews, 57 adopted the strict 
corrm:,n law rule rather than the American rule. Plaintiff lower riparian 
sought to enjoin defendant city from using two springs for its water 
supply alleging that they were part of the source of a river which flowed 
through plaintiff's land and thus his water supply was being depleted by 
defendant's withdrawals. The plaintiff, in effect, argued that the springs 
and river were part of one water supply system and each user's right was 
correlative to the others. Unfortunately plaintiff was unable to show that 
the springs affected the supply of the river. The court adopted the comnon 
law rule that all ground water is presumed to be percolating and the party 
56Bag w • bl 0 p 1· . 0 ley, ater Rights law and Pu ic o icies Relating to Ground 
Water ''Mining" in the Southwestern States , 4 J. law and Economics 
144 (1961). 
57 200 Ky. 467, 255 S.W. 84 (1923). 
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alleging the existence of an underground stream has the burden of proof. 
The court concluded that the evidence showed only that the springs were 
separated from the river by a low ridge and that they continued to flow 
during dry cycles while the river became only a series of stagnant pools. 
The case is a correct application of the COIIIIOn law. It is unfortunate 
that the facts did not establish an interrelationship between the springs 
and the river as it would have given the court an opportunity to develop 
same guidelines to coordinate the use of ground and surface supplies. 
The court announced the corraron law rule as follows: 
"The law seems well settled that water percolating through 
the soil is not, and cannot be, distinguished frcm the 
soil itself. The owner of the soil is entitled to the 
waters percolating through it, and such water is not subject 
to appropriation." However, "once a stream is known to 
exist the presumption is that it has a fixed and definite 
channel through which it flows and which varies only with 
. , ,.58 
the erosion which the water produces. 
The absolute ownership rule has similar consequences to the rules 
governing capture of oil and gas although the justifications vary and 
logically should lead to different results. The overlying owner has the 
right to capture all the oil and gas beneath his land. He rray create a 
pressure differential and cause oil or gas to drain to his property from 
adjoining tracts as long as his wells are confined within vertical planes 
corresponding to the surface boundaries of his property. The reason given 
by the courts was that oil and gas are analagous ta wild anirrals and birds 
58
rd. at 86. 
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which constantly migrate from one place to another and thus ownership 
of the tract on which they--or the oil and gas alight--is the only basis 
for ownership. The reason given by the Norse court for ownership of per-
colating water is much closer to scientific fact. Subsurface liquids 
tend to be relatively stationary and migrate only when a pressure differential 
is created beneath an adjoining tract. The logical consequence of the Norse 
court's assertion that percolating water can not be distinguished from the 
soil itself is that the overlying owner could enjoin an adjacent owner from 
pumping if he proved that pumping caused drainage from his land. It could 
be conceptualized as analagous to his right of trespass against anyone re-
moving soil without his consent but the Court of Appeals has applied the 
rules of capture of oil and gas to ground water. 59 Each overlying owner has 
a correlative right to pump and if one =eates a pressure differential 
and causes drainage, the remedy of the other is to go and do likewise. This 
rule functions to the benefit of society as long as there is an abundance 
of the resource or society desires to encourage rapid exploitation, but 
it results in an inefficient use of the resource if there is a need to con-
serve it for future use. 
Another consequence of the absolute ownership theory is the encouragement 
of short-run waste. Thus, Kentucky, as did most other American jurisdictions, 
soon rrodified the strict cornm:m law rule and adopted the "American" or 
"reasonable use" rule in Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley. 60 Plaintiff over-
lying landowner alleged that defendant coal company drilled a sixty (60) 
foot core hole which caused the water of plaintiff's well to disappear. 
59 11The right of the owner of land to drill wells and take percolating 
water is analagous to the right of the proprietor to take oil and gas." 
Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley, 292 Ky. 168, 169, 166 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1942). 
60 292 Ky. 168, 166 S.W.2d 293 (1942). 
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The defendant subsequently plugged the hole and the water in plaintiff's 
well rose to fourteen inches contrasted with its former level of four 
and one half feet. Plaintiff alleged that defendant interfered with the 
flow of an underground stream and thus injured plaintiff's riparian rights. 
The court found no evidence of the existence of an underground channel and 
treated the problem as one of determining competing rights to percolating 
water. The court denied damages but in doing so adopted the "American" 
or "reasonable use" rule for future cases. 
The distinction between the strict colllllOn law or "English" rule and 
the "American" or "reasonable use" rule is that under the latter "the 
right of the landowner to subterranean or percolating waters is limited 
to a reasonable and beneficial use of the waters under his land, and he 
has no right to waste them through malice or indifference, if, by such waste 
he injures a neighboring land owner. " If, however, the use of the water is 
found to be "legitimate" the owner is entitled to,all he can use regardless 
of the depletion caused to his neighbor's supply. 
The reasonable use rule for ground water should not be confused with 
the reasonable use rule applied to. surface waters. The former reasonable 
use rule does not grant each overlying owner a right to a proportionate 
share of the ground water in the basin. It merely places limited restraints 
on the use <the overlying owner may make of the water. He cannot waste it 
by letting it flav from the well but as long as his use is considered 
"legitimate" he is entitled to all the water he desires. The limited scope 
of the reasonable use rule is illustrated by an analogous early Kentucky 
case from the law of oil and gas. In L::iuisville Gas Co. v. Central Kentucky. 
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61 d' 1 d '° he Na Gas two a Jacent easees compete ~or t contract to supply 
gas to I.Duisville. The contract was awarded to plaintiff and defendant 
retaliated by extracting large amounts of gas to manufacture carbon black. 
90,000,000 cubic feet were extracted to produce a quantity lampblack worth 
about $12.00. The Court of Appeals enjoined the continued operation of 
the factory reasoning that "plaintiff and defendant have each the right 
to take gas fran the camoon source of supply, but neither lll3.Y by waste 
destroy the rights of the other. 11 The reasonable use doctrine thus lll3.kes 
it virtually impossible to coordinate surface rights with ground water 
rights because it places minimal restraints on the overlying owners scope 
of use. 
The successful assertion of riparian rights to an underground stream 
depends on a showing that the stream was a known as opposed to a hidden 
underground stream. If the overlying owner lll3.kes a reasonable use of 
water supplied by underground springs he is not liable to adjoining land 
owners for injuries to their wells if the springs are fed by "hidden 
62 
underground streams flowing in unknown channels or percolating waters." 
Thus , hidden underground streams are treated by the same rules as applied 
to percolating waters. In Kentucky all ground water is presumed to be 
percolating. This means that the party asserting the applicability of 
riparian rights must prove that there is an underground stream. Once 
this is proven that burden shifts to the other party to prove that it is 
unknown and does not flow in a definite and fixed channel. In Comrronwealth 
61117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 368 (1903). 
62 
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v. Sebastian the Court of Appeals affirmed a Judgment agalilSt the 
Department of Highways for interference with a known underground stream 
and indicated some of the evidence which will be necessary to get a case 
to the jury on this issue. The court held that the existence of a line 
of green grass which grew even in dry weather was sufficient to take the 
case to the jury. 
Mention should be ffi3.de of the rules developed in California to allocate 
ground water. California has a hybred law of water rights for it embraces 
both the riparian and appropriative system. Riparians have first preference 
to the water and if a surplus exists, it ffi3.y be appropriated and diverted 
to non-riparian lands. As conflicts among pUlllpers became acute, the California 
Supreme Court realized that both.the English comron law rule and "reasonable 
use" rrodification were unsuited for the arid west. In Katz v. Walkinshaw64 
the California Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of correlative rights 
which held that each overlying owner had a right to a proportionate share 
of the common pool, thus applying the concepts developed to allocate SUI'-
face streams to ground water basins. Conflicts continued to grow especially 
among rrrunicipalities which were J1Dre often appropriators rather than over-
65 - · .· 
lying owners. In City of Pasadena v. ~ of Alhambra the court was called 
on to adjudicate rights to the Raymond basin serving much of the San Gabriel 
63345 S.W.2d 46 (1961). 
64141 Cal. 116, 74 Pac. 766 (1903). 
6533 Cal.2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949). The problems of allocating and 
conserving ground water in the Los Angeles basin are exceedingly complex. 
For a discussion of the settlements reached by various claimants see Reis, 
A Review and Revitalization: Concepts of Ground Water Production and Manage-
ment--The California EKperience, 7 Natural Resources J. 53 (1967). 
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Valley in IDs Angeles County. 11:Jst claimants were appropriators seeking to 
adjudicate rights because of the continued decline in the water table. The 
California Supreme Court did not attempt to determine priorities to rigorously 
apply the doctrine of prior appropriation but instead developed a new theory--
mutual prescription--to allocate the supply. Each plllllper had to reduce 
his withdrawals by the ratio of his rate of withdrawal for the previous five 
years to the safe annual yield. 
K.R.S. 151.120 appears to have abolished the common law distinction 
between waters flowing in known and defined underground streams and per-
colating water. All water beneath the ground is now public water and a 
permit must be secured for its withdrawal. Kentucky has thus taken a major 
step toward the cocrdination of surface and ground water rights for the 
interrelationship between the two systems can now be considered in the 
Division's decision to deny, grant, or condition a permit. 
The declaration that all ground water is now public water could be 
challenged on the grounds that as applied to percolating waters it is an 
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. This argu-
ment is.stronger in the case of percolating waters than in the case of 
modification of surface rights because of the repeated declarations by the 
Court of Appeals that such waters are the absolute property of the over-
lying owner. A n1.Dilber of western states have faced this argument in applying 
the doctrine of prior appropriation to ground waters. Early cases held 
ground water appropriation statutes unconstitutional but the more recent 
. . 66 . 
cases have held them constitutional. The rationale has been that the 
public interest in the efficient allocation of water resources requires 
66see State ex rel Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007, appeal 
dismissed, 341 U.S. 924 (1951), State ex rel Bnery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 
207 P. 2d 440 (1949). Hanson v. Salt lake, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 (1949). 
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that private property rights be subject to reasonable limitations. The 
general problems of the constitutionality of Chapter 151 are discussed 
infra and are applicable to the constitutionality of declaring percolating 
waters public. 
ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS BY PRESCRIPTION 
67 
Riparian rights may be acquired by prescription. The person asserting 
a prescriptive right to an ascertained anount of water lllllSt prove that his 
I 
f 
i 
r 
use has been (1) open and notorious, ( 2) continuous, and ( 3) adverse to the r 
interests of the party against whom the prescriptive right is claimed for 
the statuatory period permitted by the statute for actions to recover 
interests in real property. The period is fifteen years in Kentucky. 68 
Cons~tive prescriptive rights are often difficult to assert because it 
must be shown that the downstream riparian against whom the right is claimed 
has suffered substantial injury as a result of the alleged adverse use. If 
the use is made pursuant to an agreement between the two parties, it can 
not be prescriptive unless it has exceeded the scope of the agreement for 
the statuatory period. 
Chapter 151 does not specify the relationship between prescriptive 
rights and the permit system. It could be argued that KRS 151.150 means 
that acquisition of a permit is now the exclusive method for obtaining a 
water and thus prescriptive rights can not be obtained after 1967. However, 
the rrore appropriate analogy might be to the recording acts where adverse 
possession has always been a recognized exception in order to protect 
th:>se who have relied on the existence of firm rights based on a long period 
67 
'-d c· · · So h Ry 86 "4 9 c ) nu erson v. incinnat1. ut em • , Ky.  , 4 1887 . 
68KRS 413. 010. 
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f . 69 hi . d by h o continuous actual use. If t s analogy is accepte t e Court of 
Appeals, prescriptive and the permit system are two mutually exclusive 
meth:Jds of obtaining water rights. 
69ror an argument that prescriptive rights should be exerrq:,ted from the 
permit system see JQetzing, Prescriptive Water Rights in California: Is 
Application a Prerequisite?, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 369 (1951). The contrary view 
is stated in Craig, Prescriptive Water Rights in California and the Necessity 
for a Valid Statuatory Appropriation, 42 Calif. L. Rev. 219 (1954). 
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Chapter III 
PURPOSE OF CHAPI'ER 151 
KRS ch. 151 creates a new system of water rights. It contains elements 
of the riparian system and of the doctrine of prior appropriation but 
does not contain all elements of either system. Like President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt's New Deal it is neither fish nor foul. To understand the 
changes made by the new system in the cannon law of riparian rights, it 
is first useful to summarize briefly the chief criticisms which have been 
made against it and the theories of water allocation urged by welfare 
econcmists. Structural reforms in the existing legal system have been in 
response to demands for greater efficiency in the allocation of our water 
resources. 
The major defect in the riparian system has been its inability to 
create rights to a firm quantity of water in advance of litigation.and the 
fact that often water can not be transferred to non-riparian land unless 
the user is able to bear the cost of purchasing the riparian land. These 
defects are not serious when there are few water shortages, but they 
becone extremely serious when prolonged shortages exist or incompatible 
uses are proposed. Some economists maintain that the function of water 
. • • le 71 law is to create firm rights so that the free mar et can operate. If 
rights can be quantified for time and arrount, they will become freely 
transferrable like any other species of property and the market will 
71 . . . . . . . . See, Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision Making: A Critique, 
2 J. Law and Econcmics 41 (1959). 
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operate to allocate them to their optimum use. There are of course several 
defects in the market system. For example, it does not provide for the 
allocation of rights which may have little or no market value but which 
should be recognized. The preservation of·a wild river is a good example 
of the kind of use which would not be achieved under the market system but 
which may be.in the public interest. 
Thus, there is a need for some state modification of the corrrnon law of 
riparian rights if water is to be.put to its most efficient use and the 
public interest protected. Chapter 151 contains a lengthy statement of 
purpose which states the Cornnonwealth's intention to regulate future uses 
of water in broad and sweeping teilllS. 
151.110 Water Resources, Policy Stated. 
The conservation, development and proper use of the water 
resources of the Commonwealth of Kentucky has become of vital 
~ortance as a result of population expansion and concentra-
tion, industrial growth, technological advances and an ever 
increasing demand on water for varied industrial, rrrunicipal 
and recreational uses. It is recognized by the General 
Assembly that excessive rainfall during certain seasons of 
the year causes damages from overflowing streams. However, 
prolonged droughts at other seasons curtail industrial, 
rrrunicipal, agricultural and recreational uses of water and 
seriously threaten the continued growth and economic well 
being of the Cornnonwealth. The advancement of the safety, 
happiness and welfare of the people and the protection of 
property require that the power inherent in the people be 
utilized to prom:ite and to regulate the conservation, develop-
ment and most beneficial use of the water resources. It is 
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hereby declared that the general welfare requires that the water 
resources of the Cornmonwealth be put to the beneficial use to 
the fullest extent of which they are capable, that the waste or 
non-beneficial use of water be prevented, and that the conserva-
tion and beneficial use of water be exercised in the interest of 
the people. Therefore, it is declared the pclicy of the Comnonwealth 
to actively encourage and to provide financial, technical or other 
support for projects that will control and store O\Jl'.' water resources 
in order that the continued growth and development of the Cornrronwealth 
might be assured. To that end, it is declared to be the purpose 
of KRS Chapters 146, 149, 151, 262 and 350.029 and 433.750 to 
433. 757 for the Commonwealth to permit, regulate, and participate 
in the construction or financing officialities to store surplus 
slll'.'face water for futlll'.'e use; to conserve and develop the ground water 
resources of the 0:mronwealth; to protect the rights of all per-
sons equitably and reasonably interested in the use and avail-
ability of water; to prohibit the pollution of water resources 
and to maintain the nonnal flow of all streams so that the proper 
quantity and quality of water will be available at all times to 
the people of the O:mronwealth; to provide the adequate dispcsi-
tion of water am:,ng the people of the Comnonwealth entitled 
to its use dlll'.'ing severe droughts or times of emergency; to 
prevent harmful overflows and flooding; to regulate the con-
struction, maintenance and operation of all dams and other 
barriers of streams; to prevent the obstruction of streams 
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and floodways by the dumping of substances therein; to keep 
accurate records on the amount of water withdrawal from 
streams and watercourses and reasonably regulate the amount 
of withdrawal of public water; and to engage in other activi-
ties as may be necessary to conserve and develop the water 
resources of the Comronweal th of Kentucky. 
'!he primary purpose of this section was to establish a firm basis 
for state regulation in the event of a constitutional challenge to the 
statute but it also gives some indication of the scope of contemplated 
public regulation. KRS 151.110 theoretically envisions an active role 
for the state for it touches on alrrost all aspects of water planning and 
regulation. '!his is reenforced by the declaration that the state's police 
power must be used both "to prorrote and to regulate the conservation, 
development and m:Jst beneficial use of the water resources," of the Cornrron-
wealth. 72 '!he phrase "beneficial use" is imported from Western State 
constitutions and statutes which generally provide that beneficial use is 
the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right to use water. '!he term 
has never been precisely defined and functions muc.'1 the same as the concept 
of reasonable use in the doctrine of riparian rights. It defines broad 
categories of use which are deemed·socially desirable by the state. It 
does not, however, incorporate precise criteria for allocating water. Thus, 
at best it can serve to define outer limits of the individual's right to 
use water in order to prevent the wasteful use of natural resources. 72a 
72
'Ihe Division is empowered to study existing problems in the area and, 
with the approval of the Department of Natural Resources, propose any needed 
legislation. KRS 151.220 (2) 
72
~ 151.110 (1966) states that one of the reasons for enacting the 
statute was to prevent "the waste or nonbeneficial use of water ••.• " 
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For example, in 1926 the California Supreme Court held that a riparian was 
entitled to the seasonable overflow in order to irrigate uplands and thus 
. d . all 1 . . . k 73 was require to l.Jlst cost y J.rT1gat1on wor s. The consequences of 
this h:>lding meant that downstreair, riparians and appropriators would often 
have lit_tle water during the spring although much larger am:iunts would be 
available if the upper riparian were limited to water actually needed to 
raise his crops. The specter of a full scale return. to the natural flow theory 
lead to the enactment of Article 28, section 3 of the California Constitution 
which provided, "It is hereby declared that because of the conditions pre-
vailing in this state the general welfare requires that the water resources 
of this State be put to beneficial use .•• and that waste or unreasonable 
74 
use or unreasonable methods of use be prevented • • • • " The California 
Supreme Court subsequently held that a riparian had no "natural right" 
to the full use of the seasonable overflow and was entitled only to a pro-
portionate share of the overflow. Claims were to be adjusted by the 
75 
concept of reasonable use. Herminghouse and the subsequent revision of 
73 . . . . Herm:inghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 
252 Pac. 607 (1926) cert. denied 275 U.S. 486 (1927). 
74eai. Constitution Art. 28, Section 3 (1928). 
75Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal.2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935). 
See also Mare Irrigation Dist. v. Llndsay-Stratrrore Irrigation Dist. , 
3 Cal.2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935). The cases are also notable for their 
errphasis on engineering rather than legal solutions as the preferred 
method of settling water use conflicts. The court held that the 1928 
amendment contained the power to :inq:,lement a physical solution to allocate 
the water am:Jng the respective claimants. 
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the California constitution illustrate the limitations the state may impose 
on water use to promote its "beneficial use." The state may limit the right 
to use water to the minimum rather than the maximum amount necessary to 
support the activity in order to achieve an optimum allocation among the 
greatest numbers of claimants. The reasonable use rule of riparian rights 
also gives the court the power to limit individual use practices which seem 
wasteful in view of the large numbers of competing demands on the resource. 
Thus, under both comnon law and KRS Ch. 151 the state has the power to cur-
tail excessive water use demands. 
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Chapter IV 
STRUCTURE OF WA'IER RESOURCES PLANNING 
The 1966 revision of Chapter 151 created a Division of Water within 
the Department of Natural Resources. The Division of Water has three 
basic functions: (1) L:,ng range planning for the use of the Conm:mwealth's 
Water Resources, (2) Implementation of state water plans, and (3) 
Adjudication of Individual Claims. This section will analyze the structure 
of the Division in an attempt to determine it has been organized in a 
manner which will allow it to carry out its functions efficiently. To 
do this it will be useful to compare relatively simple structure of water 
resources planning and regulation in Kentucky with the ccmplex planning 
and regulatory structures created in California. 
California has three separate bodies to plan and implement its state 
1 . 76 (1) water po icy: . The California Water Canrnission, (2) The State Water 
Rights Board, and (3) The Department of Water Resources within the Resources 
Agency. The California Water Canmission is to serve as the long range 
planning agency. It is canposed of public citizens and it was conceived 
as a watchdog over the Department of Water Resources. The basic powers 
of the Canmission are the right to file appropriations on all 1113.jor sources 
of unappropriated water and then to release these priorities to agenc~es 
in accordance with the California State Water Plan. 
76 
See Strauss and Murphy, California Water I.aw in Perspective 
West's Annotated California Water Codes 1 - 36 - 40 (1956). 
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Kentucky has no equivalent authority. Chapter 151 creates a 
Kentucky Water Resources Authority. The Authority is composed of the 
Governor, the Comnissioner-afNatural Resources , the Comnissioner of Heal th, 
the Comnissioner of Corrrnerce, the Carrrnissioner"afAgriculture, and the 
Attorney General. The Authority is empowered to engage in long range 
. 77 b O plannJ.ng ut its chief function is to act as the state agency for 
contracting with the Corps of Engineers for water supply space in their 
. . 77a . . 
multipurpose reservoirs. Such an agency has neither the tJJne or the 
technical skills to engage in long range water resources planning. 
However, as water supplies become roc,re scarce in Kentucky, the state may 
wish to consider the creation of an agency canposed of citizen members to 
formulate policy for the long range use of the state's water resources • The 
first step would be to create a body whose powers were advisory only. 
77KRS 151.130 (1966) 
The water Resources Authority of Kentucky is ~owered to co-ordinate 
the programs of all state agencies in the conservation, development and 
wise use of public water. KRS 151.360 (2) Its principal powers are: 
Cl) The oonstruction and regulation of water resource projects within 
the Comrronwealth, KRS 151.370 (1966). (2) The purchase and exercise of 
the rights of emninent domain for the right to use lands selected by 
the Authority for water resources projects, KRS 151.370 (2) (1966) 
(3) To issue revenue bends to pay for the projects, as well as to 
charge and oollect revenues for the use of the services and facilities 
of projects, .KRS 151.370 (3,4) (1966). (4) To make and enter into 
such agreements with the Federal Government, the Commonwealth, or any 
other political subdivisions incidental to the execution of its other 
enumerated powers. KRS 151.370 (8) (1966). 
77
~e Division is concentrating its efforts on a five year data 
gathering and analysis program in order to acquire the factual basis 
necessary to coordinate the development of the state's water resources. 
The program is described in Department of Natural Resources, Division 
of Water, Water Resource Planning in Kentucky 92 - 95 (1967). 
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California separates the adjudicative function from the planning 
and implementation function. Permits to appropriate are handled by the 
State Water Rights Board. The Board receives applications for permits 
to appropriate, holds hearings , and decides whether to grant or deny the 
permit. A separate adjudicative body is necessary in a water-short state 
because of the many conflicting demands on a limited resource. The 
judicial nature of the California State Water Rights Board procedures 
also insures that a greater nUIIlber of interested parties will be heard. 
For example, an applicant in California has to publish his application 
at his own expense while in Kentucky the applicant is not required to do so. TJ-e 
statute provides no procedure for public hearings.on permit applications. 
The Division of Water performs both an adjudicatory and planning 
function. It is empowered to issue permits for the withdrawal of water 
as well as to formulate long range plans for the use of the state's water. 
At the present time the Division's functions are confined to data gathering 
. 77a 
and analysis and review of federal water plans. However, a potential 
conflict between the di vision's functions may exist in the future. The 
Division is charged both with protecting private and public interests. 
It can issue permits to private individuals as well as plan and implement 
state projects. This could lead to situations where it would be faced 
with a conflict of interest situation in deciding to issue or deny a 
permit. If these situations arise with any frequency, it may be necessary 
to separate the adjudication function from the planning function by the 
77~e Division is concentrating its efforts on a five year data 
gathering and analysis program in order to acquire the factual basis 
necessazy to coordinate the development of the state's water resources. 
The program is described in Department of Natural Resources, Division 
of Water, Water Resource Planning in Kentucky 92 - 95 (1967). 
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creation of a quaisi-judicial agency to hear permit applications. The 
public interest would be represented before the adjudication agency by 
the Division of Water and private interests might be better served if 
permit applications were heard by an impartial administrative body. 
The most important water resources planning and program implementation 
in Kentucky will be done by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. 
The Corps has jurisdiction over navigable waters within the state. This 
jurisdiction stems from the corrrnerce clause and an unbroken chain of Supreme 
Court decisions has given the Corps almost unlimited power to plan and 
construct ITD.llti-purpose reservoirs for flood control, ITD.lnicipal water 
78 
supply, and recreation. The Corp's power over the navigable waters of 
78In U.S. v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (l898) the 
Supreme Court held that the federal government could enjoin the construction 
of a dam whose purpose was to impound water for irrigation which was located 
in the non-navigable headwaters of a navigable river because downstream 
navigability would be effected. As improvement of navigation became a 
secondary purpose for federal intervention, the Supreme Court developed the 
fiction that as long as some relationship between navigability (which was 
early defined as water vmich was navigable in fact for purposes of corrunerce, 
The Daniel Bell, 10 Wall 557 (1870) and corrunerce.was shown the project 
could be operated for other "incidental" purposes such as flood control and 
storage. The·Supreme Court almost abandoned the fiction in the First 
Arizona against California litigation, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) by holding first 
that if the river was once used for navigation and subsequently abandoned, 
the federal government had the power to restore the river for that use. 
The significance of the opinion, h::,wever, was its sweeping declaration that 
as long as some nexus between navigation and the project was shown all other 
incidental uses, even if they were in fact the main purposes for the project, 
were validated. In making this sweeping grant of power the Court indicated 
that they would not undertake a detailed review of congressional declaration 
of navigability. Federal jurisdiction was extended to the non-navigable 
tributaries of a navigable stream in Oklahoma ex rel Phillips v. Guy F. 
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (194l). The final blow to the navigation fiction 
was dealt in l965 when the Supreme Court held that the Federal Power Comnission 
could assert jurisdiction over a project vmich would be built on a non-
navigable tributary of a navigable stream for the purposes of generating 
power to be sold in interstate commerce but vmich would have no effect on 
downstream navigability. FPC v. Union Electric, 381 U.S. 90 (1964). Comerce 
rather than navigability is n= the basis of federal jurisdiction. See 
generally Morreale, Federal Power over Western Waters, the Navigation Power 
and tre Rule of No Compensation, 3 Natural Resources J. l-l3 (1963). 
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the state is a pararrount to that of the state. They are required by statute 
to give state agencies an opportunity to review project proposals but the 
• 0 79 h state has no power to compel or reJect a proJect, Furt er, the Corps 
has the power to administer the distribution and use of water according to 
regulations and policies which rray conflict with state law. 80 Although 
the Corp' s power is great, they 'hcM:: not chosen to use it in a rranner to 
engender bitter federal-state conflicts as has been the case between the 
U.S. Bureau of Reclarration and the western states. The Corps has rrade i;t 
a policy of obtaining local and state approval prior to construction of a 
81 
project and thus the style of Corps-state relations is generally harnonious. 
79 Mx>cly v. Texas Water Comn:i.ssion, 373 S.W.2d 793 (Texas 1963). 
80see Goldberg, Interposition - Wild West Water Style, 17 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1 (1964) for a discussion of the cases. 
81
see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Procedures for Conception, 
Authorization, and Construction of Projects, Survey Investigation and 
Reports: General Procedures, Engineering Manual EM 1120-2 101 (1964); 
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Chapter V 
FUNCTION OF PERMIT SYSTEM 
The Kentucky pennit system can serve three functions in the allo-
cation of the state's water: 
(1) It can provide a means of securing accurate data on the am::iunt 
of water presently being used. 82 This data can be correlated with stream 
flow and ground water infonnation so that accurate projections about 
future use and demand can be made. The primary purpose for passage of 
the statute was to provide a means of gathering this data and this will 
83 
remain the chief function of the statute during its early years. 
( 2) It can provide a means of ooordinating water resource develop-
ment so that the wasteful duplication of facilities can be prevented. 
For example, if two public agencies or private entities desire to build 
substantially identical protects which would serve the same class of 
users , the Di vision could grant the penni t which, in their discretion, 
ha f ben -· . 84 s the rrost avorable cost- efit ratio. Courts have interpreted the 
82KRS 151.220 (1966) authorizes the Division of Water to undertake a 
research program in order to formulate a state-wide flood control and 
water development program. The Division is given the authority to under-
take continuous studies and to corporate with local, other state, and 
federal agencies involved in water resources planning and development. 
831.o . '11 ' uisvi e Courier Journal, Sunday, August 6, 1967, Sec. F., 
p. 3, col. 3. 
84see Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d, 957 discussed in 
Trelease. Policies For Water: Property, Rights, Economic Forces, and Public 
Regulation. S. Natural Resources J. 1, 17 (1965). 
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permit system for appropriations to empower state agencies to grant 
only one of two or more competing applications because it has the most 
favorable cost-benefit ratio. 
(3) The permit system can provide an administrative means of 
adjudicating rights between competing private parties, competing public 
agencies or combinations of the two. The extent to which KRS Ch. 151 
substitutes a new system of water rights for the riparian system is not 
clear, but the statute can rationally be construed to substitute adminis-
trative for judicial adjudication for KRS 151.110 specifies that regulation 
of water rights is one of the purposes. 
All persons (public or private) desiring to withdraw, divert, or 
transfer public water Imlst register with the Division of Water and 
subni t an application for a permit. However, the legal status of a 
permit is not clearly delineated by KRS Ch. 151. Kentucky has not adopted 
the prior appropriation system for KRS 151.200 makes it clear that priority 
of the date of the permit's issuance will not govern the allocation 
of water in times of scarcity. KRS 151.200(1) provides: 
"Not withstanding the existence of any permits for the 
withdrawal, diversion, or transfer of public water, in 
times of drought, emergency, or other similar situations 
requiring a balancing of rights and availability of water 
between water users, the division, with the approval of the 
authority may temporarily allocate the available public 
water supply among water users and restrict the water with-
drawal rights to permit holders , until such time as the 
condition is relieved and the best interests of the public 
are served. " 
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This section is the antithesis of the doctrine of prior appropriation. 
The economic utility of an appropriation permit is that the user can 
estimate in advance how he will stand in times of scarcity and thus pro-
ceed through the market to acquire other rights should he need them to 
protect himself. A Kentucky permit, however, gives the holder no 
basis to determine how much water he will be entitled to in times of 
scarcity. All that KRS 151.200(1) does is carry over the most economically 
undesirable features of the riparian system. The only perceivable 
change is that determinations of reasonable use are now made by administrative 
rather than judicial forums. This section will be discussed infra. 
It is, however, clear that substantial modifications in the riparian 
system were implemented. KRS 151.200(2) abolishes, for example, the 
restriction that withdraws must be used within the watershed if other 
riparians could be injured by a trans-basin diversion. The Division 
may now issue a permit for the transfer of public water fran "one stream 
or watershed area to another, where such transfer is consistent with 
the wise use of the public water of the Ccmnonwealth and is in the best 
interests of the public. 11 The watershed restriction has been one of the 
most criticized features of the riparian system and will be discussed 
infra. 
The relationship between KRS 151 and the riparian system is further 
confused by the description of the rights conferred by a permit con-
tained in KRS 151.170(1). It provides that all permits issued ..• 
shall be specific in terms of quantity, time, place and rate of diversion, 
transfer or withdrawal of public water." This looks like an attempt 
to quantify water rights and thus evidences a legislative intent to 
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replace the riparian system. However, this inference is not supported 
by the next sentence of the statute which reads, "Such permits represent 
a limited right of use and do not vest ownership nor an absolute right to 
withdraw or use the water." This section makes it unclear whether the 
permit supercedes or merely complements the riparian system with a regis'-
tration system designed to gather information. 
The dcrninant purpose behind the enactment of KRS ch. 151 was to 
secure adequate data for future water resources planning. 85 If this were 
the only purpose, then it =uld be logical to conclude that the permit 
system is designed only to give the Division accurate water data and 
does not supercede the doctrine of riparian rights. However, there are 
substantial modifications in the corrmon law doctrine--the abolition of 
the watershed rule and the distinction between percolating ground water 
and ground water in a subsurface stream support the rational inference 
that the permit system was intended to supercede the comrron law except 
85KRS 151.160 provides: (1) All public water withdrawn pursuant to 
a permit under KRS 151.140, must be recorded and a report thereof kept and 
sent to the division as hereinafter provided. (2) Beginning July 1, 1967, 
all persons, business, industries, cities, counties, water districts and 
other political subdivisions withdrawing, diverting or transferring 
public water under a permit from the division, must record the am::iunt 
of water withdrawn, diverted or transferred each day. Quarterly reports, 
on forms to be supplied by the division, indicating am::iunts of public 
water withdrawn, diverted or transferred, shall be timely sul::mitted to 
the division. (3) The division or any of its authorized representatives 
shall have the right to enter and inspect water withdrawal records at all 
times to determine whether such records are correct and in proper order. 
(4) The willful failure to keep accurate records of the withdrawal, 
diversion, or transfer of public water or the failure to timely sul::mit 
quarterly reports upon demand by the division shall subject the permit 
holder to being called for a hearing before the division and possible 
penalties under KRS 151.990. 
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where it is specifically preserved by an exemption. This inference is 
further supported by the existence of Sections 150 and 160 as well as 
llO's statement of policy. Section 150 states in general terms the require-
ment that every person desiring to use public water must secure a permit, 
while Section 160 specifically empowers the Division to gather accurate 
data by requiring quarterly reports of withdrawals actually made under 
the permit and giving the Division the right to inspect withdrawal 
records. 'Ihe two separate sections are evidence that the legislature 
contemplated that the function of the pennit system would be both regulatory 
and information gatheringo 
The legal status of a pennit should be clarified by the legislature. 
The statute should clearly indicate whether the legislation is designed 
solely to facilitate data gathering for public planning or whether the 
pennit gives the holder a property right to use the allotted a:rrount of 
water and thus creates a new system of water rights. As the following 
discussion of the permit procedure and exemptions will indicate the 
present statute is a hodgepodge of riparian rights, prior appropriation, 
the Iowa permit system, and several novel concepts. All these add up to 
an incomplete water use regulation statute in need of substantial clari-
fication. 
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Chapter VI 
OPERATION OF PERMIT SYSTEM 
EXEMPI'IONS 
KRS 151.140 provides: 
No person, business, industry, city, county, water 
district, or other political subdivision shall have the 
right to withdraw, divert, or transfer public water from 
a stream, lake, ground water source or other body of 
water, unless such person, business, industry, city, county, 
water district or other political subdivision has been 
granted a pennit by the division for such withdrawal, diver-
sion, or transfer of water. 
The definition of public water expands the previous statutory 
definition. K.R.S. 262.680 provided: 
"Water occuring in any natural stream, natural lake or other 
natural water body in the Comnonwealth which may be applied 
to any useful and beneficial purpose is hereby declared to 
be a natural resource and public water of the Corrm:>nweal th 
and subject to control and regulation for the public welfare." 
K.R.S. 151.120 now provides: 
[151.120 Public Water of Cormnonwealth, What Constitutes.] 
(1) Water occurring in any stream, lake, ground water, sub-
terranean water or other body of water in the Cormnonwealth 
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which may be applied to any useful and 'beneficial purpose 
is hereby declared to be a natural resource and public water 
of the Comrronwealth and subject to control or regulation 
for the public welfare as provided in KRS Chapters 146, 
149, 151, 262 and 350.029 and 433.750 to 433.757. 
(2) Diffused surface water which flows vagrantly over 
the surface of the ground shall not be regarded as public 
water, and the owner of land on which such water falls or 
flows shall have the right to its use. Water left standing 
in natural pools in a natural stream when the natural flow 
of the stream has ceased, shall not be regarded as public 
water and the owners of land contiguous to that water shall 
have the rights to its use. 
Th O broad . 86 Th . f . e statute contains exemptions. e exemption or :urrpoundment 
of diffused surface waters has been previously discussed. The broadest 
exemption is for domestic and agricultural uses. KRS 151.140 states: 
Provided however, no permit shall be required and nothing 
herein shall interfere with the use of water for agricultural 
and domestic purposes including irrigation. 
86KRS 151.140 also exempts water injected underground in conjunction 
with operations for the production of oil or gas. These uses of water 
are regulated by the Department of Mines and Minerals. KRS 353.570 
requires any person desiring to inject water into the ground e.g., 
for purposes of instituting a secondary recovery operation--to obtain 
a permit fran the Department of Mines and Minerals. A plat of the pro-
posed well is required and spacing requirements may be imposed by the 
Department. 
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The use of water for industrial processing or manufacturing is also 
exempted provided that the water is returned in "substantially the same 
quantity and condition as it is withdrawn •••• 1187 The purpose of this 
section is to exempt non-cons~tive withdrawals. Agreeably there is 
no need to regulate these types of withdrawal since by definition the 
water is available for re-use downstream and the main problems with 
these withdrawlas are quality rather than quantity problems. However, 
the w::irding of this sentence could cause problems for those :imnediately 
downstream from the industry because there is no requirement that the 
water be returned to the stream at the locus of withdrawal. This will, 
of course, be done in nost cases but a user :imnediately adjacent to the 
industry could be injured if the manufacturer is given unlimited discre-
tion in choosing his point of return. 
The exemption for domestic uses is a codification of the canrnon law 
and is carTied over from the 1955 statutory codification of the riparian 
doctrine. The statute defines meaning of "domestic purposes" as follows: 
"The w::ird domestic purpose shall mean the use of water for ordinary 
household purposes , and drinking water for poultry, livestock and domestic 
an:imals. 1188 The conm:,n law domestic preference was originally limited to 
87 
KRS 151.140 (1966) 
K. R. S. 151.12 0 also exempts "water left standing in natural 
pocls in a natural stream when the natural flow of the stream has 
ceased" from the definition of public water. The owners of land con-
tiguous to the pocls have equal rights to its use. 
88KRS 151.100(10) Cf. Iowa Code, section 445A.l (1962) which limits 
the domestic preference and exemption to "Ordinary household purposes, 
use of water for poultry, livestock, and danestic animals . • • " See Hines, 
A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit System--Part 1, 7 
Nat. Resources J. 499, 508-509 (1967). 
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the ordinary needs of a single household and livestock necessary to 
support it and Section 100(2) appears to incorporate this definition 
range89 The uses allowable under the domestic preference will not 
affect a significant amount of water and little is lost if such 
withdrawals are not included in a regulatory scheme. However, some 
courts have applied the domestic preference to institutions and commercial 
resorts. 90 This is an unwarranted extension of the cOJill!Dn law preference 
and should not follow under KRS 151.100(10). If a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme is to be implemented, the preference should be confined to small 
withdrawals related to a single household. 91 The exemption for all 
agricultural uses including irrigation greatly expands the previous law. 
It was commonly assumed that the domestic preference would be limited to 
water for the immediate household needs of the farmer and would not be 
extended to water for an ag-business such as irrigation of tobacco and 
stock watering as it now is. The reason for the exemption is undoubtedly 
the immense political muscle of the Farm Bureau which views with extreme 
alarm any regulation of farm activities. Similar exemptions, for example, 
were obtained in the 1966 revision of planning and zoning enabling 
89It has been assumed that the domestic preference would not 
apply to corrrnercial agricultural operations. See Water Rights I.aw 
in Kentucky, Legislative Research Carrnission, Research Publication 
23, 8 (1965). 
90Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal.2d 549, 150 P.2d 405 (1944), The cases 
are split on the right of state institutions to qualify for the preference, 
See Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the I.aw of 
Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1, 4 (1957). 
91under the Mississippi appropriation system the exemption for 
domestic uses is provided but the user may establish a statutory right. 
Miss. Code Ann. §5956-04(a) (1956). 
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legislation. 92 There is no economic or social justification for the 
exemption and it should be eliminated as soon as political circumstances 
permit. Agriculture is increasingly becaning a business rather than a 
way of life. Voluntary sales of farm land are resulting in the increased 
consolidation of tracts in order that economics of scale can be achieved 
in farming operations. Larger arrounts of water will be diverted for 
agricultural purposes and this exemption could frustrate state-wide 
cocrdination of water use for a potentially large source of supply will 
be unregulated. 93 
KRS 151.210(2) provides that the owner or groups of owners of 
land contiguous to public water who are operating under a withdrawal 
permit have the right to impound such water behind a dam in the natural 
stream bed or on their land "when the flow of the stream or level of the 
lake is such that impounding will not impair existing uses, or will not 
interfere with the beneficial use by other water users." The intent of 
this section is unclear. It follows the section preserving the preference 
for domestic uses and could be interpreted to establish a preference 
for riparian users although it does not· specifically so state. It could 
be argued that Kentucky has adopted a modified version of California's 
dual system of water rights which gives riparians a preference to the water 
. 93a . 
and confines appropriators to surplus waters. This would mean that a 
92KRS 100.203(4) (1966) provides: Text provisions to the effect that 
land which is used solely for agricultural, farming, dail:ying, stock-raising, 
or similar purposes shall have no regulations imposed as to building permits, 
certificates of occupancy, height, yard, location or courts requirements for 
agricultural buildings, except that (a) setback lines may be required for 
the protection of existing and proposed streets and highways, and (b) that all 
buildings or structures in a designated floodway or flood plain or which tend 
to increase flood heights or obstruct the flow of flood waters may be fully 
regulated. 
93The Department reported that tobacco is the principal crop which could 
require irrigation. If a drought year occurred, sane 36,000 acres w:,uld require 
4,320,000,000 gallons of water. Kentucky Water Resources, supra note'.±_ at 22. 
93<>see Duckw::lrth v. Watsonville Water Co., 170 Cal. 425, 170 Pac. 58 (1915). 
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riparian permit holder would prevail over a non-riparian in times of 
shortage. However, the wording of Section 210(2) is not wholly consistent 
with this analogy because the right to impound is conditioned on.non-
interference with "a beneficial use by other water users." '.This would 
seem to mean that the riparian is given no preference and may only impound 
if the water is available. '.This is simply a codification of the principle 
that an impoundment is not a per se unreasonable use. If this is correct, 
the section adds nothing substantive to the Chapter except to further 
reassure farmers that nothing has changed. 
The section may, however, have been included to implement that policy 
contained in KRS 151.110 of maintaining the nonnal flow of all streams. 
For example, the Iowa Water Code contains a provision requiring the regula-
tory agency to protect the established average minimum flow of the stream 
93b 
when permits for consumptive uses are granted. If this is the function 
of Section 210(2) the division will be required to classify Kentucky's 
streams according to their functions. The flows necessary to sustain 
fish and wildlife, recreation, water quality, and downstream needs must be 
calculated and form the basis for denying or granting a permit. If this 
is the purpose of the section, it should be clarified and amplified so 
that the public may know the factors the division is empowered to consider 
in establishing minimum flows and lake levels. 
93b Iowa Code 455A. l (1962). See Hines, A Decade of Experience 
under the Iowa Water Permit System, 7 Natural Resources J. 499, 537-546 
(1967) for a discussion of the problems which will be encountered in 
administering minimum flows and lake levels. The special problems of 
wildlife protection are discussed, Russell, A Survey of Streambank Wildlife 
Habitat (Paper presented at the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Southeastern 
Association of Game and Fish Corrunissioners, October 24-26, 1966, Ashville, 
North Carolina). 
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APPUCATION PROCEDURE 
The procedure for acquiring a permit is deceptively simple. KRS 
151.150 requires that an application be submitted, (A copy of the application 
is set out in the appendix), The major emphasis in Ch. 151 is on accurate 
reporting of data rather than adjudications of conflicts. During the 
first year after KRS Ch. 151 became effective about 600 permits were 
issued which were numbered and coded by county and river basin and inserted 
into a computer program, The same is done with the required quarterly 
withdrawal reports. 
The procedure for obtaining a permit after an application is 
filed is not clear. The Division is not required to hold a hearing 
prior to issuance, In this respect Kentucky differs f:rom other states, 
such as Iawa, which have modified the riparian system for they require 
that the administering agency hold a hearing to determine if the permit should 
be issued. 94 The Kentucky procedure is spelled out in KRS 151.170(2). 
The Division is required to conduct an investigation to determine if the 
quantity, time, place or rate of withdrawal will be detrimental to the 
public interest or to the rights of other public users. If it is found 
that public and private rights will not be affected, the permit must be 
issued. The use of the word "shall" indicates that if the Division makes 
these two findings but refused to issue a permit a writ of lll3l1damus 
for its issuance could be obtained. The last sentence of the subsection 
provides "No permit shall be denied to a responsible applicant who has 
94 
See Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit 
System. 7 Natural Resources J. 499, 514-15 (1967), 
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established an amount of water for which he has a need for a useful 
purpose, provided the requested amount of water is available. " The 
intent of this sentence and its relation to the preceding one specifying 
the findings the Division !IDlSt make is unclear. It was probably intended 
to allay the fears of existing users that the new scheme would take away 
existing rights. However, the sentence introduces two new terms 
"responsible applicant" and "useful purpose" which are capable of admin-
istration determination. Thus, the sentence actually gives the Division 
broad powers over the issuance of a permit because it may investigate the 
financial responsibility of a proposed applicant and the economic utility 
of the proposed use. It is conceivable that the division could find that 
water is available and other rights would not be adversely affected but 
still refuse to issue a permit because they do not deem the applicant 
"responsible" or the proposed use "useful." The applicant would have a 
right to judicial review of these determinations but could not obtain a 
writ of mandalffils because of the descretionary nature of the di vision's 
function. 
POWER OF DIVISION OF WATER TO AILOCATE DURING PERIODS OF SHORTAGE 
KRS 151.200 authorizes the division to make temporary allocations 
am:,ng pernri.t holders "in times of drought, emergency or other similar 
situations requiring the balancing of rights and available water am:,ng 
users." This meth::ld of administrative allocation is not found in either 
the common law of riparian rights or the doctrine of prior appropriation 
as it developed in the far west. It is analogous to the powers given to 
public officials during the first settlement of the Far West before the 
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development of a coherent body of water law doctrines. When the l-brnons 
reached Utah in 1847 they were not burdened by any rigid notions of the 
righteousness of the free enterprise system. Water was considered the 
property of the state (it should be emphasized that it was the property 
of the state and not the public) and county courts were given the power 
to allocate water "as in their judgment shall best ••• subserve the 
• • ' 0 • f O • ' "95 1nterests of settlement 1n the distribution o water for irrigation. 
Wyoming passed a statute ve:ry similar to this in 1876. 96 According to 
one of the leading legal historians of the development of western water 
law, the doctrine of prior appropriation replaced these early attempts at 
administrative allocation of water after lawyers began to be alarmed at 
the power which became concentrated in the state--plus the fact that the 
administrative allocation was labeled french and italian and thus per se 
97 
inferior. 
Section 200 simultaneously rejects the doctrine of prior appro-
priation and substitutes a new standard for apportionment for the concept 
of reasonable use embodied in the c0111110n law of riparian rights. Adminis-
trative allocation has been substituted for judicial adjudication of rights. 
However, in practice the division will probably undertake the same kinds 
of inquiries as have the courts in determining whether a proposed use is 
reasonable and in adjudicating correlative rights. The unfortunate aspect 
95No citation is available. The statute is quoted and discussed in 
Lasky, Fran Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by 
the State Via Irrigation Administration, 1 Rock Mt. L. Rev. 161, 167 (1929). 
96Cornbined Laws of Wyo. of 1876, ch. 65, Sec. 4. 
97Lasky, supra, note 95 168-170. 
- 60 -
r 
r 
r 
[ 
I. 
I. 
L 
L 
L 
of Section 200 is that it incorporates into the permit system all the 
undesirable features of the riparian system. The same uncertainty as 
to the amount to which a riparian will be entitled in times of scarcity 
is carried over into the permit system. Thus, nothing appears to have 
been gained by Section 200. 
The section, in this author's opinion, confuses the role of 
administrative allocation in a free rrarket system for water rights. The 
goal of a water law system should be to encourage users to put water to 
its optimum use consistent with the public interest. This can be achieved 
through a system of administrative allocation which hears applications for 
a permit by h::llding a hearing to determine if a permit should be issued. 
The purpose of the hearing is to define the relationship between the pro-
posed use and the public interest97~ The administrative agency should 
make the following inquiries to determine whether the permit should be 
issued: (1) Is the proposed use efficient or will another proposed use 
serve the same users more efficiently? For example, if a city and water 
district are in competition to serve a fringe area of the city, it would 
be proper for the division to determine which of the tW'.l uses will result 
in the vast expensive distribution of water, (2) Will the proposed use 
affect the reservation of water for public uses such as recreation which 
will be allocated by the existing rrarket system of water rights. (3) Should 
the water be presently developed or reserved for future public or private 
uses? (4) Will the proposed use shift external costs to other users and 
members of the public when these costs should properly be J::orne by the 
97a 
This model is taken from Trelease, Policies for Water law: Pro-
perty Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 Natural Resources 
J. 1 (1965). The concepts are fully discussed in the article. 
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the permit holder>? 
If the administrative agency concludes that the proposed use is I 
consistent with the above criteria a permit should be issued. The permit 
received should be capable of being used like any other> species of proper>ty 
such as land. It should be definite in arrount, time and place as provided I 
in KRS 151.170(2). But, it should also allow the holder to rely on the 
existence of a firm supply in times of scarcity. This does not mean that 
he should be able to rely on the perpetual existence of the arrount and 
conditions contained in the permit but it .<:ices mean that he should be able 
to calculate the arrount of curtailment he must suffer and either adjust 
his activity accordingly or proceed through the ffi3.J'.'ket to acquire other 
permit holder>' s rights as insurance. This can be done t= ways" ( 1) either> 
the prior appropriation system can be adopted as it has been in Mississippi, 
or (2) some sort of correlative rights system can be formulated similar 
to doctrine of mutual prescription developed by the California Supreme 
Court in the ground water> cases (discussed earlier>) where each user> knows 
the percentage of the curtailment he must bear. Either one of these t= 
systems combined with the previously discussed public criteria for allo-
cation would produce a ffi3.J'.'ket system which will encourage optimum uses 
consistent with the public interest. 'The Kentucky permit system as 
embodied in KRS 151. 200 in theory will not accomplish this. This is 
irrelevant as long as there are no conflicts arrong users rut could impede 
the efficient distribution of water when they begin to occur. 
A related defect in Chapter 151 is its failure to specify the 
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duration of the permit. 98 KRS 151.170(1) provides such permits represent 
a limited right of use and do not vest ownership nor an absolute right 
to withdraw or use the water." It vDuld be preferable if the permit 
holder were given a right in perpetuity to use the water subject to its 
being extinguished under the following t= conditions: (1) the use 
of the water has been abandoned, 99 or (2) the division finds under KRS 
151.170(4) that the permit holder is using substantially less than the 
permit amount. 'Ihis last section gives the state ample powers to eliminate 
wasteful uses of water and the broad language of subsection (1) is not 
needed. If the duration of the right is specified the ITBrket can then 
operate to shift uses as new demands arise or the state can.use its power 
to condemn the right if it decides the water should be put to different use. 
Chapter 151 contains no provision making the permit appurtenant 
to the land of the holder. Thus, it rray be transferred without a sirnul-
taneous transfer of sone interest in the property. The absence of an 
appurtenancy requirement will rrake water rights rrore freely aleinable than 
under the riparian system where the person desiring water had also to 
bear the cost of purchasing riparian land. 
One of the obvious objectives of KRS 151.200(1) was to provide a 
method for apportioning municipal water supplies during short run drDughts. 
The traditional methods of insuring the continued availability of municipal 
water supplies have been a legislative grant of the power of eminent dorrain 
98 See Trelease, supra at note 97 at 23-26. 
99 See Yentzer v. Hemenway, 440 P.2d 7 (Wyo. 1968). The state has the 
power to cancel a permit in whole or in part depending on the extent of 
the abandonment. 
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or a prefenmce. If a municipality is given the power of eminent dana.in, 
those persons who claim interfenmce with their rights are restricted to 
an action for darrages and can not obtain injunctive relief. If the city 
is given a true prefenmce, other non-preferred users l!lllst curtail their 
use in order to supply their wants. It is too early to ascertain the 
effectiveness of Section 200(1) and thus a detailed evaluation will not 
be attempted at this time. 
TRANSBASIN DIVERSIONS 
KRS 151.200(2) which provides that the division may authorize the 
transfer of diversion of public water from one watershed to another 
"where such transfer is consistent with the wise use of public water of 
the Corrrnonweal th and is in the best interests of the public," abolishes 
the watershed limitation in the corrmon law riparian system. The limi-
tation's rationale, set out in the leading Massachusetts case of Stratton 
100 
v. fuunt Hermon Boys School, was that a trans-watershed diversion would 
decrease the amount of return flow available to downstream users and 
thus upset the hydrologic cycle. The limitation has never been an absolute 
barrier to trans-watershed diversions for an injunction will not be 
granted if the proposed diversion were reasonable and riparians within 
the watershed could show no present need for the water. 101 The doctrine 
has been criticized because it can lead to the waste for resources, if 
rigidly applied, because it may deny needed present uses to reserve the 
l00216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913). Stratton recognized that 
injury lllllSt be shown before an injunction could be granted. 
101 
-See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Burkett, 177 Tex. 16, 297 S.W. 273 (1927). 
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water for future uses which may never materialize. Section 151.200(2) 
could be interpreted merely to codify the generally accepted comnon 
law exception discussed atove to the doctrine, but its language indicates 
that its intended scope was broader. 
Section 200(2) should be interpreted to give the division the power 
to use the perlllit system to implement basin and state-wide water plans. 
Basin and state-wide water plans require a carrprehensive analysis of 
the relationships between uses within and without the basin. It must 
also consider factors such as the impact of the proposed diversion of 
the public interest in recreation and fish and wildlife preservation. 
Of the llBl1Y factors which must be taken into account by the division, one 
of the rrost important is the present and future needs of the area of origin 
of the water. These areas,102 such as Eastern Kentucky, often have large 
surpluses of water but often argue that water should not be transferred 
outside the area because it must be reserved for future and undeterlllined 
demands. The division must consider long and short run demands such as this in 
deterlllining whether to grant or issue a permit for a trans-watershed diversion. 103 
102 
For a discussion of legislative protection of areas of origin 
see Johnson and Knippa, Transbasin Diversion of Water, 113 Texas L. Rev. 
1035 (1965). 
103 . . . be . . d by Vested riparian rights can not inJure a trans-watershed 
diversion, although they may be condemned for use outside the watershed. 
For a statute authorizing condemnation if consistent with certain criteria 
see N. C. Gen. Stat. §162A-7(c) (19611). 
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'Ibe imp:irtance of Section 200(2) is that now the state is not bound by 
non-functional classifications such as the watershed of origin but 
may issue or deny permits based on their relationship to basin and 
•ct l 104 state-wi e water pans. 
104see Ref. 102 at 1057-1061. 'Ibe authors approve a statute such as 
KRS 151.200(2) if it is used to grant or deny permits in conjunction with 
a state-wide water plan. 
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Chapter VII 
REGULATION OF DAM CONSTRUCI'ION 
The new legislation gives the Division of Water new powers to 
coordinate the construction of dams and other structural improvements. 
KRS 151.250 requires that any private person or organization and all 
public entities except the State Highway Department desiring to construct, 
reconstruct, relocate, or improve "any dam, ernb3nl<ment, levee, dike bridge, 
fill or other obstruction . . . across or any stream . . . . " IlnlSt obtain 
a pennit from the Division. The only requirement ~sed by ch. 151 
is that the application contain the plans and specifications for the 
proposed structure but the Division may issue regulations for the 
issuance of permits and the application procedure. The plans and speci-
fications IlnlSt be drawn by a professional engineer licensed under,J<RS 
Ch. 322. The Division has the power to exempt structures from the permit 
requirement by regulation if they decide that a permit is not necessary 
"in the interest of safety or the retention of water supply." If these 
regulations are enacted, relief for small farmers who desire to build 
small ponds or engage in minor fill work can be implemented without 
105 
sacrificing the objectives of the statute. 
The Division has twenty (2) working days after receipt of the plans 
to reach a decision and notify the applicant if a permit will be granted 
105For a discussion of depth, area, height and other exemptions 
from a similar Maryland statute see Galbreath, Maryland Water Law: Water 
Laws and Legal Principals Affecting the Use of Water in Maryland 65-66 (1965). 
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d • d 106 or enie . The Division has the power to grant a permit subject 
. to the acceptance of m:idifications. 107 KRS 151. 25 0 appears to incorporate 
two standards to guide the Division in making their decision. The first 
is safety. This is obvious and should cause little controversy. The 
second is "retention of water supply" and the general standard of bene-
ficial use. Section 250(3) specif.ies that "Nothing in this section is 
intended to give the Division any jurisdiction or control over the 
construction, reconstruction, improvement, enlargement, maintenance .. 
or operation of any drainage district, ditch, or system established for 
agricultural purpose, or to require the same when such obstruction of the 
stream or floodway is determined by the division to be a detriment to 
or hindrance to the beneficial use of water resources in the area •• 11108 
106Th d "f if f ·1 . hin e statute oes not speci y ai ure to approve wit twenty 
( 2 0) working days will result in automatic approval for the applicant. 
Similar language in subdivision enabling legislation which requires that 
the administrative agency has an affirmative duty to disapprove within the 
statutory period or the permit will be considered. See, e.g., KRS 100.183 (1966). 
l07KRS 151.260(2) (1966). 
108A frequent source of litigation between riparians is over damage caused 
by obstructions placed in the stream which cause water to back up or flood onto 
the land of others. A riparian is liable if he causes damage to another riparian 
by an unreasonable obstruction. Crabtree Coal Mining Co. v. Bamby's Adm'r 183 Ky. 
647, 90 S.W. 226 (1906). KRS 151.250 (2) (1966) is an attempt to minimize liti-
gation by forcing the applicant to consider the potential damage his obstructions 
might cause in advance and to take the necessary steps to eliminate it so that 
there will be no need for litigation after the fill has been completed. 250(2) 
p:rovides: No person, city, county or other political subdivision of the state 
shall commence the filling of any area with earth, debris, or any other material, 
or raise the level of any area in any manner, or place a building, barrier or 
obstruction of any sort on any area located adjacent to a river or stream so 
that such filling, raising or obstruction will in any way affect the flow of 
water in the channel or in the floodway of the stream unless plans and specifi-
cations for such work have been subnitted to and approved by the division arid a 
permit issued as required in subsection (1) above. KRS 151. 310 (1966) prohibits 
non-fill deposits which "will in any way restrict or disturb the flow of water 
in the channel or in the floodway of any stream except where a permit has 
been issued •.. under KRS 151. 250 ••• " Encroachments on federal and state dams 
are also prohibited. - 68 -
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This section was probably intended to allay the fears of farmers and 
other agricultural interests against the spector of state control but 
it is difficult to gage its impact on permit applications. 
This definition of beneficial use appears to be different than the 
definition incorporated into the policy statement and by implication 
into the standards for granting a use permit. In this latter context 
beneficial use is a one dimensional standard for it merely defines broad 
categories of socially desirable uses. If the water is available and 
the use fits within one of the broad categories, the permit should be 
granted. The definition in !<RS 151.250 combined with the :implication 
in 250(1) that the Division is to consider the impact of the project of 
the state's water supply appears to be more like the requirement in planning 
and zoning enabling legislation that the ordinance be in accordance with 
the comprehensive plan. Section 250(3) contemplates the eventual existence 
of state-wide and watershed development plans which should give the division 
and the courts objective criteria to determine if a proposed structure is 
consistent with the coordinated, develoµnent of the area's water resources. 
Presumably if the Division finds that the proposed facility duplicates 
existing facilities or that any other proposed system of structures has a 
lower cost-benefit ratio, the permit could be denied under 250(3). 
!<RS 151.270 preserves a right of judicial review for any person 
who wishes to contest Division denial or modification of a permit. The 
applicant has sixty days to file an appeal from a division order in the 
circuit court. The proper circuit court is not specified but presumably 
the legislature intended the same rights to be conferred on parties 
contesting denial of a structure permit as those contesting a use 
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pennit so the circuit court of the county in which the applicant resides 
w::,uld be the proper forum. The case will be heard without a jury and the 
proponent of the project has the burden of proof, The usual right of 
. . 109 
appeal to the Court of Appeals is provided. 
If a person starts construction without a pennit he is liable to 
a maximum fine of one thousand (1,000.00) dollars for each separate day 
that the offense continues. 110 In addition to being liable to a fine, 
he may enjoined fran further w::>rk on the project. The pennit holder may 
not deviate fran the approved plans without the pennission of the Division, 
'Ihe statute defines an offense in addition to starting construction without 
a pennit as "Any substantial deviation from approved plans , , . 11111 
The Division has the authority to periodically inspect any structure 
r 
l 
r 
which restricts the flow of water in a stream. 112 If structural defects which co~ 
cause personal injury or property damage are discovered, the Division may 
schedule a hearing to detennine what corrective measures must be taken,113 
After the hearing an order to make the necessary repairs may be issued. 
The failure to comply with a remedial order is a violation under KRS 
151.990. 114 The pennit holder may appeal to the circuit court and eventually 
to the Court of Appeals. 
If any structure is found to be a "serious threat" to life or property, 
the Division shall direct the Attorney General to secure a mandatory injunction 
against the owner for the correction or removal of the structure.115 
l09KRS 151.280(1) (1966). 
llOKRS 151.990 (1966). 
lllKRS 151.280(2) (1966). 
112KRS 151,290(1) (1966). 
113KRS 151.290(2) (1966). 
114KRS 151.290(3) (1966). 
115KRS 151,290(4) (1966). KRS 151.460 (1966). 
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Chapter VIII 
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS AND THIRD PARTIES 
A RIGHT TO HEARING 
'Ihe Kentucky statutory scheme differs from those enacted in other 
states such as Iowa because a hearing is not required prior to the issuance 
of a permit. 'Ihe director of the division has the authority to make 
three choices when he receives an application for a permit. He may issue 
it for the amount requested, he may issue it for less than the amount 
requested. It is found that a reduction would "be in the best interests 
of the public or other water users, 11116 and he may deny it if it is found 
· · f . . ab 117 that sufficient water or the proposed use is not avail le. In addition 
the permit may subsequently be amended if it is found that the user is using 
less than the granted amount. 
'Ihe division merely notifies 
. . h d ll8 issued int e requeste amount. 
the applicant if the permit has been 
If it intends to mxlify or deny, the 
division must notify the applicant and give him the opportunity to appear 
before the division. If the division still m:xlifies or denies the permit, 
the applicant may appeal to the circuit court of the county in whieh 
he resides within thirty (30) days after issuance of a division, 
116KRS 151.170(1) (1966). 
117KRS 151.170(2) (1966). 
118Ibid. 
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order. This procedure for a hearing before the division guarantees 
the rights of applicants to procedural due process and thus is not subject 
to constitutional defects. 
The rights of third parties are not similarly protected. This 
would not be a serious defect if the purpose of the permit system is 
confined to information gathering but it is if used for regulatory purposes, 
and third party rights to the use of public water are adversely affected. 
The legislature contemplated that third party rights are a relevant 
factor for the division to consider in permit applications. The question 
thus becomes: do third parties have sufficient rights to entitle them to 
legal protection if they desire to contest the issuance of a permit? 
The question requires a determination of whether third parties have 
, . . . . . 120 I uld a substantial interest in a division order. two seem that they 
clearly do since KRS 151.170 makes it theoretically possible for the 
division to issue a permit which might reduce the amount of water to which 
they might be entitled had they appeared before the division. However, 
119KRS 151. 180 provides: Notice and hearing before denial of permit; 
appeals. Prior to the denial of an application for a water withdrawal 
permit or the issuance of a permit for amounts less than the applicant 
applied for, the person, business, industry, city, county, water district 
or other political subdivision aggrieved thereby, shall be notified by the 
division and given an opportunity to appear before the division and be 
heard. Within thirty days of an order of the division denying a permit, 
or an order issuing a permit in amounts less than those applied for, the 
aggrieved person may appeal the order of the division to the circuit 
court of the county in which the applicant resides as provided in KRS 
151.190 (1966, c. 23, 22). 
120 
For a discussion of third party rights to appeal administrative 
orders, see Oberst, Parties to .Administrative Hearings, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 
578, 402-404, and Hines, supra note 53-61. 
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the Court of Appeals could find that thiru parties are not adversely 
affected by division oruers because a permit lacks finality since they 
are entitled to appeal to the circuit court under KRS 151.190 which 
preserves a right of judicial review to any party aggrieved by a corrmission 
oruer. Thus, it is probable that the Court of Appeals would find that 
a division oruer is not final because the issue of thiru party rights 
can be litigated by a court and are not settled by division action. 
There is another procedural right involved which may be controlling 
in deciding if the thiru party provisions are free frum constitutional 
defect. Thiru parties have a constitutional right to adequate notice 
of pending proceedings affecting their interests in oruer to protect 
their right to due process. KRS 151.180 requires that notice of an 
adverse oruer be given only to aggrieved applicants. No similar duty 
exists for thiru parties. Thus, under KRS ch. 151 the thiru party 
has no method of ascertaining the existence of the issuance of a permit 
which might be adverse to his interests except by chance. 
The constitutional standaru of a person's right to notice of pro-
ceedings which may affect his interests is : "The reasonableness and 
hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended 
on the ground that it is on itself reasonably certain to inform those 
affected , .• or, where conditions so not substantially permit such 
notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring 
home notice other than feasible and customary substitutes." 121 Because 
121 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 365 
(1950). See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962). 
(procedure for condemnation of riparian rights which provided for notice 
by posted handbills rather than a letter held unconstitutional). 
- 73 -
KRS ch. 151 provides no requirement that third parties be notified of a 
pending permit application or that a permit has been issued, I conclude 
that the rights of third parties have not been given the required constitu-
tional protection. Thus, a permit should be subject to collateral attack 
by a third party who considers his rights affected by the issuance of 
a permit. 
A 1956 Kansas federal district court decision might indicate, 
however, that KRS ch. 151 is not constitutionally defective because it 
does not provide for notice to third parties whose rights might be affected 
122 by issuance of a permit. In Baumann v. Smrha it was argued that the 
Kansas appropriation statute was unconstitutional because it did not give 
third parties notice of a permit hearing. The statute provided that all 
permits would be issued subject to vested rights and the court held that 
since vested rights must be protected, by definition a third party could 
not be injured by the issuance of a permit. KRS 151.170(2) does not 
expressly require protection of vested rights (the problem of protection of 
vested riparian rights is discussed in the next section) and thus it does 
not appear that the rationale of Baumann can be applied to KRS ch. 151. 
In addition the court's reasoning ignores the problem of effective pro-
tection to third parties. The requirement that vested rights be protected 
should not be equated with a third party's rights to notice. The former 
requirement saves the statute from being held an unconstitutional taking 
but it does not insure a procedure for protection of third party's right 
122145 F. Supp. 617 (D, Kan. 1956 ). For a discussion of the kind of 
notice which would meet constitutional standards see Hines supra at 57-60. 
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to due prucess. In order that these rights be effectively preserved a 
court should h::ild that third parties were entitled both to prutection of 
existing rights from elimination by administrative action and to notice 
when these rights might be affected. 
RIGHT TO APPEAL 
The requirement that applicants and third parties IIU.lst wait until 
entry of a final order before appealing to the circuit court is a codi-
fication of the rule that a litigant IIU.lst exhaust his administrative 
remedies before appealing to the courts, There are several objections 
to this which are recognized in Kentucky, The applicant need not exhaust 
his administrative remedies if he wishes to attach the constitutionality 
of the statute or the pruvision being applied to him. The applicant also 
need not exhaust if he can show that exhaustion would be futile, or if 
he can show that the policy of the administrative agency is fixed and will 
not vary in subsequent administrative actions. 
The statute does not specify any standards for judicial review 
other than the substantial evidence test. It will prubably be assumed 
by the Court of Appeals that the statute incorporates other generally 
accepted standards such as (1) action in excess of granted powers and 
( 2) lack of procedural due prucess . The Court of Appeals in American 
123 
Beauty Homes reviewed the numeruus standards of judicial review 
adopted at various times by the General Assembly and concluded that all 
verbal formulations could be reduced to a single standard: 
123 
379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964). 
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'Ihe uncorrelated legislative attempts to designate 
specific considerations controlling the scope of judicial 
review are aimed in the proper general direction, but the 
fact of the rratter is that they have not rraterially affected 
or changed the pattern of review. 'Ihis is so because the 
scope of review is basically founded upon the independent 
exercise of judicial power, and limitations irrposed by the 
legislature will not prevail if they fail to protect the 
legal rights of a complaining party. As we have heretofore 
indicated, the courts can and will safeguard those rights 
when questions of law properly present the ultirrate issue 
of arbitrary action on the part of an administrative agency. 124 
Standards of judicial review give the Court of Appeals a great 
deal of trouble. 'Ihis stems from the continued hostility of members 
of the Kentucky bar to administrative agencies and a reliance on the 
courts to decide all legal questions. For a number of years applicants 
aggrieved by an order of the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning 
Commission were entitled to a trial de novo in the Jefferson County 
circuit court. 'Ihe court was free to make its own findings and substitute 
them for those of the commission. In 1964 the Court of Appeals held that 
this procedure was unconstitutional because it resulted in a delegation 
of legislative functions to judicial bodies. In setting the standards 
for judicial review KRS 151.190 attempts to steer a course between 
delegating legislative functions to the courts and giving the courts 
an active supervisory role over the work of the division. 
KRS 151.190 provides: 
IID.y person aggrieved by a.final order of the division rray 
obtain a review of the order by filing in.the circuit court 
of the county in which the applicant resides , within thirty 
124 
379 S. W. 2d 457 (Ky. 1964 )o 
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days after entry of the order, a written petition 
praying that the order be m:x:lified or set aside in whole 
or in part. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith 
served upon the division, and thereupon the division 
shall certify and file in court a copy of the reccrd 
before the division, including therein all pleadings, 
orders, documentary exhibits,any stenographic transcript 
of testirrony before the division. When these have been 
filed, the ccurt shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
to affirm, IIDdify, enforce or set aside the order, 
in whole or in part. No objection to the order may 
be considered by the ccurt unless it was urged before 
the division or there was reasonable grounds for 
failure to do so. The findings of the division as 
to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, 
are conclusive. If either party applies to the court 
for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shows to 
the satisfaction of the ccurt that the additional 
evidence is material and that there were reasonable 
grounds for failure to adduce the evidence in the 
hearing before the division, the ccurt may order the 
additional evidence to be taken before the division in 
such a manner and upon such condition as the court may 
- 77 -
consider proper. The division may rrodify its findings 
as to the facts, by reason of the additional evidence 
so taken; and it shall file any rrodified or new findings 
with the court, which if suppcrted by substantial evi-
dence shall be conclusive, and may file any recomnenda-
tion for the rrodification or setting aside of the original 
order. The comnencement of proceedings under this 
section does not, unless specifically ordered by the 
court, operate as a stay of the division I s order. Pm 
appeal may be taken from the judgment of the circuit 
court to the Court of Appeals on the same terms and con-
ditions as an appeal is taken in any civil action. 
(1966, c. 23, § 23) 
The first part of the section enacts the substantial evidence standard. 
This is the traditional standard of judicial review and limits the court's 
function to a determination of whether the division complied an adequate 
factual basis for its conclusions. The burden to prove that the findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence is placed on the applicant. The 
court must still, however, determine whether the reasons given by the 
conrrnission are conclusions of fact or law. The formerare not reviewable 
except under the standard discussed above while the latter are fully re-
viewable and the court is free to substitute the decision for the divisions. 
This kind of determination could prove troublesane for the courts. 
Many of the determinations the division is authorized make, such as 
whether the propcsed use is for a "useful purpcse," call for value judg-
ments rather than for scientific determinations which can be verified 
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by objective criteria such as finding that a sufficient quantity of water 
is or is not available to satisfy the anount requested in a permit. It is 
likely that courts will categorize determinations such as "useful purpose" 
as questions of law and thus subject to review. A good example of the 
kind of categorizations the court will make is found in ~ of Covington 
. , 125 
v. Board of Comnissioners of Kenton County Water District. The district 
filed an application for a certificate of public convenience to extend 
its service which was denied by the Commission. The reason given was 
that it would result in a duplication of the cities facilities and thus 
the proposed extension would be a wasteful allocation of water. The trial 
judge reversed this finding on the theory that a determination of waste-
fulness was one of law and thus he was entitled to make it. He found that 
the facilities would not be wasteful because they could serve the area at 
a lower rate than could the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the 
broader ground that the commission's finding of duplication was unreasonable 
because there was no assurance that the City's water supply would continue 
to be available to the district. This case illustrates the great flexi-
bility courts have in reviewing administrative determinations by their 
ability to characterize questions as ones of law rather than fact. A 
court not wishing to review such a determination could conclude that these 
were precisely the kinds of questions which call for great expertise and 
were thus delegated to an administrative agency and invoke the substantial 
evidence rule to affirm the agency ruling. But, if the courts desire they 
can take an active role in reviewing division determinations. This is 
125371 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1963). 
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further underscored by the court's power to hear additional evidence if the 
applicant can prove that reasonable grou.,ds existed for failing to intro-
duce the evidence in a hearing before the division. 
Improper Delegation of Powers : 
It may be argued that K.R.S. ch. 151 is unconstitutional because 
it constitutes an improper delegation of legislative power to an admin-
istratfu: agency. Prior to the New Deal many attempted regulatory schemes 
were struck down on this ground, but the United States Supreme Court has 
not used this ground as a means of invalidating federal regulatory schemes 
since the New Deal. While many state courts have used this theory to 
bolster judicial hostility to administrative regulation, Kentucky is not 
one of them and it is unlikely that ch. 151 will be found to be an improper 
delegation of legislative powers to an administrative agency. 
The general test for legislative delegations has tradiationally been 
whether the administrative agency has been given sufficient standards 
so that arbitrary actions can be curbed. This test has given the courts 
a great deal of trouble because in complex regulatory schemes the legis-
lature is forced to define the agencies discretion in broad terms and 
courts have upheld delegations saying that precise standards existed 
when none in fact did. A leading scholar of administrative law has long 
argued that the court were incorrect in focusing on the problems of 
standards and instead should focus on the adequacy of procedural due 
process. This view has been adopted by the Court of Appeals in Butler 
v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Kentucky, Inc. 126 The court upheld 
statute against a charge, am:mg other things, of unconstitutional 
126 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961). 
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delegation which provided for public aid to private institutions which 
educated "exceptional children," After noting "In its laconic simplicity 
leaves much to be desired" and reviewing the doctrine of unconstitutional 
delegation Judge Palnore upheld it after a candid explanation of the 
delegation problem and its solution. 
"In the study fran which we have quoted it is further demonstrated, 
by numerous examples from this and other courts, that in order to find 
the effective law "one must look past the theory to the holdings. The 
correlation between the theory and the holdings is characteristically 
low, and when it is high the holdings have been unfortunate when examined 
in the light of practical needs of effective government. " Let us, 
then, examine this law in terms of the practical needs of effective 
government, and in terms of safeguards against abuse and injustice. 
The legislature wants to encourage and lend a modicum of support 
to the special education of a certain class of people, It does not 
wish, in so doing, to waste the taxpayers I money. The members of the 
legislature are allowed to meet in regular session only 60 days every 
two years. They have neither the time, facilities , nor qualifications 
to do more than indicate the class and fix the anount to be spent. At 
the state's disposal, however, is its board of education, an agency fully 
and better qualified than the legislature to establish and carry out what-
ever further policies and procedures lll3.Y be necessary or desirable. 
This body also is one of the most responsible and long-established agencies 
of the state government. Is there any real danger that it would, even if 
it could, abuse the responsibilities conferred upon it by this act? We 
think not. Moreover, since arbitrary power does not exist in this 
- 81 -
Comnonwealth, any discriminatory treatment is inherently reviewable by 
the courts, Cf. 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure 
§ 164, pp. 506-507; Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 28.21, Vol. 4, 
11127 pp. 112-113. 
The same reasoning applies to K.R.S. Ch. 151. The existence of 
procedural defects has been discussed previously. It is possible that 
the court: might find certain sections of the statute unconstitutional for 
these reasons but it is unlikely that they would find the statute to be 
unconstitutional because it results in an attempted delegation of legis-
lative functions without sufficient standards. The standards contained 
in K.R.S. ch. 151 are much more precise than those upheld in Butler 
and could be found constitutional even under a rrore tradiational analysis 
than the one adopted in that case. 
127Id. at 208. 
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Chapter IX 
CONSTITlITIONALITY OF CHAPI'ER 151 
KRS Ch. 151 presents important constitutional problems. The 
state rray regulate the use of water to further public objectives pursuant to 
its police power within the limits imposed by the federal and state consti-
. 
128 Th ' t'tut' all' 't t' th d and tutions. e lll3.JOr cons i ion lJ1lJ. a ions are e ue process 
equal protection clauses of the fifth amendment, which is applicable to the 
state's through the fourteenth, prohibits the "taking" of private property 
by a unit of government without the payment of just compensation. Doc-
trinal formulations of state authority and its limitations such as "police 
power," "private property," and "taking" have no inherent meaning except 
as they are applied to specific situations for their inherent vagueness 
makes it impossible to formulate definitions of uniform applicability. 
Much government action in some =er affects the use and therefore the 
value of private property. Sanetirnes the value of property is decreased 
as in the case of a denial of request for rezoning from residential to 
ccmnercial. Othertimes the individual is benefited by government action 
as in the case of an upland owner whose property value is increased because 
development in the flood plain beneath his land is restricted thus limiting 
the amount of land available for development. Economists and other social 
scientists have no way of defining with precision all of the costs and 
128see King, Regulation of Water Rights under the Police Power, 
Water Resources and the I.aw 271 (1958). 
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benefits of a given governmental decision and the law has required no 
h . . 129 sue precision. 'Ihe due prucess and equal protection clauses thus 
do not prohibit all governmental regulation which decreases the value of 
private property but only if it results in the "taking" of "property". 
'Ihe terms are conclusionary labels and provide few criteria to detennine 
if a given regulation is valid or invalid for they are often pinned-on 
to justify a decision 1113.de on a nore elaborate but imprecise rationale. 
'Ihe courts rrake two kinds of inquiries in deciding the constitu-
tionality of regulatory schemes such as Ch. 151. 'Ihe first inquiry 
deals with the purpose of the regulation. 'Ihe second focuses on the 
impact of the regulation on the individual property owner. Courts often 
speak of balancing or weighting the purpose with its impact on the 
individual but this formulation of the constitutional standard obscures 
the hard value choices the court is iiaking for the two approaches are 
inconsistent. 'Ihe nost praiseworthy of objectives--such as the construe-
tion of a flood control reservoir--may financially ruin an individual. 
No one would suggest that an individual farmer should gratuitously cede 
his land to the federal government for a flood control reservoir on the 
rationale that the benefits to society outweigh his individual loss. 
Yet, this same rationale is often used to support government regulations 
129'Ih · · h f h 1· · · e cases sustaining t e use o t e po ice power to lJJn1t or 
even prohibit the extraction of natural resources graphically illustrate 
the breadth of the power. See e.g., Blancett v. llintgom';!'Y, 398 S.W.2d 
877 (Ky. 1965) (City 1113.y prohibit the extraction of oil within its cor-
porate limits); Consolidated Rock Products v. Ci of Los eles, 57 Cal. 
2.d 515 370 P.2d 342 Calif. 1962 appeal diS!lllssed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962)h 
(prohibition of quarrying operation to protect quality of air in city 
which advertised itself as a health center) See generally Sax, Takings and 
the Police Power 7, Yale L.J. 36 (1964). 
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which severely decrease the value of one individual's property. The 
courts have evolved no consistent standards to enable lawyers to pre-
diet whether a given regulation will be found a valid police power 
regulation or an invalid taking and at best the cases suggest some 
rough guidelines and the doctrinal formulations scholars have suggested 
prove difficult to apply in hard cases. 
The first line of inquiry pursued by the courts is the purpose 
of the regulation. The courts require that the government dem:mstrate 
a nexus between the regulation and the public welfare. This is generally 
not a difficult burden and often a court will look no further than the 
recitals of purpose in the act. The court does not require a showing 
that some quantifiable benefits to the public will occur. It requires 
only that there is a legitimate public purpose behind the regulatory 
scheme and that the methods chosen are reasonable methods of achieving 
its objective. Once this is established the burden of proof shifts 
to the party attempting to invalidate the regulation. 130 This is a 
difficult burden to meet for it must be shown that statute is clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, has no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 
There is no doubt as to the legitimacy of the purpose of Ch. 151. 
Regulation of the development of natural resources has been a historic 
concern and function of government, Water is a resource which is 
130williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The Kentucky 
Court of Appeals has adopted the same presumption of constitutionality 
and standards of judicial review. See e.g., Fried v. Louisville and 
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, 258 S.W. 2d 466 (1953), 
and City of Richlawn v. Mahon, 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950). 
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essential to the continued vitality of the state's economy for supply 
will remain relatively constant but use demands will intensify as the 
population increases. 131 The failure to make an efficient allocation of 
this resource could result in !113.jor economic disruptions in the long run 
to the ultilll3.te detriment of substantial numbers of the state's citizens. 
The need for comprehensive water resources planning and regulation can 
be expanded at great length but it is now generally well accepted and 
it is inconceivable to think that the Court of Appeals w::iuld not find 
the objective legitilll3.te. 
The question which can not be answered with any certainty is once 
having found the objective legitilll3.te, will the Court of Appeals find ch. 
151 constitutional? The legitilll3.cy of the objective should not obscure 
the court f:rom making an inquiry into the :impact of the statute on existing 
uses of water. This first requires a determination of what rights were 
"vested" prior to the enactment of Ch. 151 and whether they have been 
"taken". The courts which have considered similar schemes have generally 
held that they are constitutional as long as vested rights have not been 
. 132 
:impaired. 
The statute makes no attempt to create a category of prior rights 
which are vested. It is not fully clear if the state is now the source 
131The importance of state-wide water planning for recreation 
was recognized by the Court of Appeals in Ccmnonweal th of Kentucky, 
Department of Highways v. Thomas (Opinion unpublished as of date of 
writing. Decision rendered December 15, 1967). 
132 See e.g., State ex rel. Elnery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 20 P.2d 
440 (1945) (Kansas Act changing f:rom riparian to appropriation system 
held constitutional). 
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of rights or if riparian rights will continue to control the allocation 
of water. As has been discussed earlier, this monograph is assuming 
that new rights will be neither appropriative or riparian but will be 
state created [Underlining added]. On this assumption the most important 
question are whether present consumptive rights will be impaired and 
whether unused riparian rights will be held to be vested. Earlier courts 
and writers have assumed that the natural flow theory or the reasonable 
use theory required that all rights, consumptive and unused, would be 
vested and thus could not be subject to state regulation unless the 
riparian was compensated for their impairment. It is clear, however, 
that state legislatures are not subject to such rigid limitations. 
The determination of what rights are "vested" and which are not 
can not be 1!13.de by any precise formula. "Vested" can be most accurately 
described as a conclusionary label applied by the courts after they 
had decided that the state should not be able to interfere with the 
individual's use of the resource without paying compensation to him. hi 
analysis of the decisions which have considered the question reveals 
that sweeping statements such as one 1!13.de in a study prepared by the 
Kentucky Legislative Research Commission that "The general rule is that 
riparian rights since they are vested property rights, cannot be taken 
or terminated by the state without compensation to the owners'' is so 
broad as to be meaningless. Some forms of riparian uses have traditionally 
been subject to police power regulation and thus the state has not had 
to compensate when they were impaired. For example, sane courts have 
upheld the right of the state or city to prohibit bathing and swinming 
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in a lake in order to protect the purity of a municipal water supply. 133 
The right to bathe, swim, and fish are recognized riparian rights but 
so classifying them does not inrnunize them fran state regulation. 
KRS 151.120 declares IIR.lch of the water in the Comnonwealth to 
be public. The purpose of the section is to create a firm theoretical 
basis of state exercise of the police power. The declaration that 
water is public has historically served as a basis for state regulation. 
134 In a recent case the Minnesota Supreme Court State v. Kulvar sustained 
a statute similar to Kentucky's which declared IInlCh of the water of state 
public and created a permit system. The court said that the statute 
was justified because: 
"It is fundamental that, in this state and elsewhere, 
that the state in its sovereign capacity possesses a pro-
prietary interest in the public waters of the state. Riparian 
Rights are subordinate to the rights of the public and sub-
ject to reasonable control and regulation by the state.135 
The foundation of rrodern assertions that water is public water stems 
from Roman law. The Romans conceptualized natural resources such as 
air and water as part of a negative ccmnunity-res communes-with 
133state v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 196 Atl. 337 (1937) appeal 
dismissed 303 U.S. 627 (1937) (prohibition not held a taking). Compare 
Bino v. City of Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956) (prohibition 
of swiJiming held a taking). The cases are collected and extensively 
analyzed in Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, Water Resources and 
the law 133 (1958). 
134266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699 (1963). 
135123 N.W.2d at 706-7. 
- 88 -
r 
r 
r 
r 
r: 
L 
r 
[ 
L 
L 
L 
L. 
L 
the consequence that they were the property of everyone until reduced 
. b . d 0 "d 1 136 to possession y an in ivi ua. The English adopted the Roman view 
calling water publi juris until reduced to possession. The Roman theory 
of the negative community does not logically imply that the state has 
the power to regulate water but it has been adapted for that purpose. 
The state adopted the theory that while the waters are "owned" by the 
entire citizenry they are also held in trust by the state for the general 
public. State declarations of trusteeship were initially confined to 
navigable waters in order to protect rights such as the right of the 
general public to fish in a navigable stream. However, the western 
states have used the trust theory to support comprehensive regulatory 
schemes over all of the water within its boundaries and presumably the 
· . 137 
same option--as Kentucky has taken--is open to the Eastern states. 
There is much confusion in the trust analogy and references to handy Latin 
phrases such as res cornrrrunes or the hypnotic publi juris. It would 
be rrnre candid for the courts to rest a regulatory scheme as Chapter 151 
on the state's general police power subject to the traditional contri-
butional limitations. Kulvar, however, is an example of the use of the trust 
theory to sustain a use regulation statute and should be followed by the 
Court of Appeals. Validation of the regulatory scheme does not, however, 
dispose of the question of whether "vested rights" are entitled to 
136ror a historical discussion of the development of Roman and 
English Comrron law see 1 Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States, 
2-13 (3rd ed. 1911). 
137For a rrnre detailed explanation of this position see '!'release, 
Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 145 Calif. L. Rev. 638 
(1957). 
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protection. The Court of Appeals could hold that a regulatory scheme 
was constitutional as an exercise of the police power but find Chapter 
151 unconstitutional because it fails to protect vested rights. The 
concept of "vested rights" is generally used to protect individuals who 
would be hurt by a new application of the law because they were induced 
to rely on the continued existence of the previous law. A frequently 
litigated problem which requires a determination of whether a right is 
vested is a person whose property is unzoned at the time he starts con-
struction of a building but it is subsequently zoned to exclude the 
contemplated use. The court must determine if he has a vested right to 
a nonconforming use. To decide this it generally inquires into the extent 
to which he would suffer financially if he were forced to cease construction 
and whether his reliance was in good faith and thus. justified. The 
Court of Appeals could hold that only consumptive rights and not unused 
riparian rights need be protected by analoging from two recent cases in 
the law of future interests and zoning which have considered the problem 
of protecting vested rights. 
In 1960 Kentucky abolished the distinction between a right of re-entry 
and a possibility of reverter. A single future interest-a right of re-entry-
was created and their traditional exemption from the policy behind the 
rule against perpetuities was abolished by limiting the right to re-enter 
upon breach of a condition to a period not longer than thirty years after 
their creation. Interests created prior to 1960 were allowed to continue 
in perpetuity if they were registered by 1965, otherwise they were to 
terminate within 30 years after the date of their creation.138 In 
1388 "-·'- . . ky p . . ee J.A.US.errunier, Kentuc erpetuities law Restated and Reformed, 
49 Ky. L,J, 1, 69-81 (1960) for a discussion of the act. 
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Atkinson v. Kish,139 the court had to construe a wil1 which contained a 
restraint on alienation which in turn created a right of re-entry in the 
heirs of the grantor. The restraint had not been exercised within thirty 
years after its creation nor had it been registered. The court held it 
was no longer enforceable and in so doing included a footnote which implied 
that the 1960 statutory scheme was constitutional although the court's reasoning 
was deceptively simple. It held that the right of re-entry in the heirs 
was not a vested right and thus not entitled to constitutional protection,140 
This is a gross overstatement of the status of right of re-entry, and 
belies the complexity of the problem. What the court seems to be saying 
is that holders of such rights are not entitled to rely on the continued 
existence of the right because the statute was enacted for a legitimate 
purpose (elimination of clogs on titles) and provided notice that the 
right would cease after a certain period unless certain reasonable steps 
were taken to preserve it. Since the holders had the opportunity to pre-
serve the right and failed to take it, it is unreasonable to conclude they 
relied to their detrement hence the right is not "vested". 
In Ashland Lumber Co. v. Williams, 141 a lumber canpany desired to 
extend a non-conforming use. They obtained an opinion from the building 
inspector and city attorney that their expansion was permissible. After 
the buiiding was ninety percent completed neighbors brought a successful 
action before the Board of Adjustment to cancel the permit. The case 
was appealed to the circuit court where the 11.Dilber company admitted that 
139420 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1967) 
140rd. at 109 note 5. 
141Ashland Lumber Co. v. Williams 411 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1966). 
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its activity violated the zoning ordinance but held it had a vested 
right to complete the expansion because they had relied to their detr:iment. 
The court rejected this argument because the lumber company had relied 
on the opinions of officials who did not have the authority to authorize 
an expansion. Ashland indicates that a finding of vested right is a 
function of justified reliance on the continued existence of the right 
and could be used to support an argument that Chapter 151 is constitutional 
as long as prior consumptive rights are protected. 
One of the major defects in Chapter 151 is its failure to specify 
clearly the statutes of consumptive rights prior to July 1, 1967. It is 
unlikely that any prior uses will be terminated or diminished under the 
statute but the possibility exists. The only section which can be read 
to protect prior rights is KRS 151.170(2) which requires the director 
to determine if issuance of a permit will be detr:imental to the "rights 
of other public water users". If this section is construed to preclude 
the extinguishment or diminishment of prior consumptive uses then the 
statute should be held constitutional. If it is not, the Court of Appeals 
might find Chapter 151 unconstitutional in so far as it fails to protect 
. 142 
vested rights. 
Kentucky would do well to amend Chapter 151 to grant express 
protection to prior consumptive uses. The best method of accomplishing 
this consistent with the objectives of Chapter 151 would be to require 
existing riparian users to quantify their rights within a given period. 
Those who quantified their rights by registering with the division ~uld 
receive a vested right while those who did not would lose their right. 
142see e.g., State ex rel. Einery v. Knapp, 167 l<an. 546, 20 P.2d 
440 (1945). 
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Oregon implemented a similar statute in 1909 and the State Supreme Court 
held it constitutional. 143 If this decision is followed in Kentucky, only 
prior consumptive uses need be accorded the status of vested rights, This 
procedure should give the Division the necessary flexibility it needs in 
implementing a new system of water rights without harming prior users 
who have come to rely on the availability of a fixed quantity of water. 
The limitation of protection to prior consumptive uses will not make it 
possible for prior users to assert paper rights to large quantities of 
water so the broad policy objectives of Chapter 151 should not be impeded. 
143 . . In Re Water Rights of Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 227 Pac. 1065 
(1924). Mississippi contained a similar provision for protection of Riparian 
when they changed to the prior appropriation system in 1956. Miss. Code 
Ann. 5956-02(g)(2) (1956). See Champion, Prior Appropriation in Mississippi--
A Statutory Analysis, 39.Miss. L. Rev. 1, 12-20 (1967). 
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Chapter X 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF RECREATION WITI:I EMPHASIS 
ON THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE 
Kentucky has a great potential for recreation. In fact, it could 
be argued that its long run economic growth lies in transforming itself 
into an agricultural and recreational reserve for the East and Midwest 
as the state has a wide-variety of sources of water-based recreation from 
free-flowing mountain streams to large lakes behind IID.llti-purpose 
reservoirs. 
The major legal problems in the recreational use of water will 
center around the following questions: (1) can a permit be secured to 
divert ar use water for recreational development, (2) can a state withdraw 
water from development to preserve it for aesthetic and recreational 
purposes? (3) what rights does the public have to the use of public water 
where the banks are in private ownership and what rights do individual 
riparian and littoral owners have vis a vis one another? ( 4) what public 
contrDl will be maintained over shoreland developnent? 
Chapter 151 does not contain a list of beneficial uses nor does it 
contain a list of preferences to determine how water will be allocated 
among various categories of users in time of scarcity. KRS 151.100 
does list the growing demand for water for recreational uses as a reason 
for enactment of the statute. It is thus probable that the court will 
look to the comrron law - and perhaps the law of prior appropriation -
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in determining if a pennit can be issued for recreational uses. It is 
necessary to distinguish between various kinds of recreation activities, 
altmugh the law has not yet begun to make such distinctions. It is 
useful to distinguish between demands for general outdoor recreation and 
. al . 144 
unique natur recreation areas. The use of water for a corrnnercial 
fishing pond versus preservation of a stream for hiking, sport-fishing 
and similar uses illustrate the two types of demands, The doctrine of 
riparian rights and prior appropriation have always recognized that 
water be used for recreational activities was a reasonable or beneficial 
145 
use but rrost of the uses have involved general outdoor recreation. 
Thus, the division should, at least, grant pennits for the diversion of water 
for recreational activities such as swirrnning pools, golf courses, small 
recreation lakes , and other cOllllilercial recreation activities. Impound-
rnents for recreational uses pursuant to KRS 151.210(2), discussed earlier, 
should also be permitted. Decisions to preserve water for unique natural 
recreation activities are best made in the name of the general public and 
will be discussed in the next section. 
Many recreation activities are consistent with the concept of 
multiple-use develoµnent, while others are not. If the state wishes to 
144To 1 if" " d . f h . f 'f" ese c ass ications are a aptations o t e six- old classi icatory 
scheme adopted by the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Corrnnission. See 
Clawson and Knetsch, Outdoor Recreation Research: Some Concepts and Suggested 
Areas of Study, 3 Natural Resources J. 250, 260 (1963) and Tarlock, Book 
Review, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 895 (1967). 
145 See Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 150 P.2d 405 (1944) and 
Meyers v. Lafayette Golf Club, 197 Minn. 241, 266 N.W. 861 (1936) (golf 
course may withdraw water from lake to irrigate its greens). 
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implement a balanced recreation plan, it will be necessary to withdraw 
certain streams from development in order that they may be preserved as 
scenic rivers, fishing and canoeing streams. This m:mograph will not 
discuss the criteria which should be used to make such withdrawals or the 
appropriate procedures which should be established within the state govern-
ment structure to make these decisions. This report will be concerned 
only with the power of the division to refuse to issue a permit because 
it conflicts with the state recreation plan or to issue a permit to an 
appropriate state agency which would have the effecting of withdrawing 
the water from further development. 
This question has been considered by several western courts and state 
agencies. They have involved attempts by the proposed user to secure 
affirmative protection for his use by giving it the status of a perfected 
appropriation. The courts and state agencies have all held that water 
can hot be appropriated for preservation of fish and wildlife and scenic 
beauty because an appropriation requires a diversion and no diversion has 
been rnade. 146 These results have been criticized for carrying the diversion 
requirement to a logical but non-functional extreme and these cases should 
not be followed in Kentucky. If the division finds that use of water for 
preservation and fish and wildlife and scenic beauty is consistent with 
state water and recreation planning, a permit should be issued to an 
appropriate state agency guaranteeing their right to a mininrum flow. 
146S d T . ee Casca e own and Water Co. v. Thrpire land and Water Co. , 
181 Fed. 1011 (D.C. Colo. 1909) rrodified 205 Fed. 123 (8th Cir. 1913). 
For an extended discussion of the problems of preservation of scenic 
rivers see Tarlock, Preservation of Scenic Rivers, 55 Ky. L. J. 745, 
756-57 (1967). 
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Likewise the division should deny a permit to a private individual 
or other public entity if they find that the proposed use would be 
inconsistent with state water recreation plans, There is ample language 
in Section 170 to support such a denial, The division has the power to 
deny a permit if the proposed withdrawal will be detrimental to the 
public interests, Preservation of scenic beauty147 is now recognized as a 
legitimate function of the state and thus the division's power to grant 
or deny a permit for this purpose should be found valid by the Court 
of Appeals. 
A major source of public rights to make recreational uses of water 
is the navigation power, 148 The power stems from the right of the Kings 
of England to control the seas and inland waterways which were affected 
by the ebb and fla-i of the tide to guarantee public rights such as fishing 
and transit, This restrictive definition of navigability was rejected 
by the American courts because it was unsuited for a nation of non-tidal 
inland waterways. The Supreme Court based the power to control and develop 
waterways for purposes of navigation on the commerce clause and held that 
a stream was navigable if it was navigable in fact for purposes of commerce. 
As government intervention in water resource development expanded from 
navigation to flood control, water supply, and recreation development 
the navigation power was used to sustain these new federal activities. 
The navigation power was extended to the states after the American Revolution. 
They assumed title to the beds beneath navigable waters and hence dominion 
147 ( See, e.g., Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 Ky, 1964) which upheld 
the control of billboards as a legitimate function of the state pursuant 
to its police power, 
148ror an excellent analysis of the development of the navigation power 
see Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the 
Rule of No Compensation, 3 Natural Resources J, 1 (1963). 
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over them. 149 This development is beyond the scope of this monograph 
and been briefly outlined earlier. The significant point here is that 
the navigation power is the source of public rights to swim, fish, boat, 
and enjoy the scenic beauty of navigable bodies of water even if the bed 
d bank . . hi 150 ""' ubl" an s are held m private owners p. sue p ic can not, of 
course, trespass private property to gain access to navigable waters. 
The navigation power involves two separate questions which have 
often been confused by the courts. The first involves the use of the 
power as a basis for gove:mrrent intervention. The second involves the 
use.of the power as a basis for not compensating the property owner who 
has suffered injury as a result of a project undertaken pursuant to the 
navigation power. The courts have generally held that the navigation 
power imposes a servitude in favor of the federal government which makes it 
impossible for a private individual to acquire a compensable interest in 
navigable waters. Thus, the courts have denied compensation for loss of 
rights for a variety of injuries such as the destruction of an oyster bed;51 
the raising of the level of the water up to the ordinary high water mark,152 
and the value of the site for power generation facilities. 153 Unfortunately, 
the courts have never sharply distinguished between the use of the power 
14941 U.S. (Pet.) 368 (1824) 
150see Reis, Policy and Planning for Recreational Use of Inland 
Waters, 40 Temple L.Q. 159 (1967) for a discussion of public rights to 
the use of water for recreational purposes. 
151Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913). 
1521.Jnited States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. 312 U.S. 592 (1941) 
1531.Jnited States v. Chandler-L\Jnbar Power Co. 229 U.S. 53 (1913). 
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to validate federal or state action and the use of the power to destroy 
property without paying compensation. There is a need to make this dis-
tinction by delineating the scope of the power and to determining what 
kinds of property interests should be protected against destruction 
without compensation. The use of power to justify the development of water 
resources for recreation underscores the need for the courts to grapple 
with these two questions. Fortunately, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
has never blindly invoked the navigation power as a basis for non-compensation 
and the two leading cases show an awareness of the need to treat separately 
the two questions outlined above. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has adopted a strict definition 
of navigability consistent with the federal standard. In Natcher v. ~ 
of Bowling Green154 the court held that a stream llfilSt be navigable in 
fact for pllrj?Oses of comnerce and emphasized that "the mere capacity to 
pass a boat of any size, however small, from one stream to another (is 
not) sufficient to oonstitute a "navigable stream. 11155 Thus, public rights 
will be confined to the state major streams and lakes under this standard 
but this will guarantee that ample water is available to the public. 
In Natcher the plaintiff's gravel bed was flooded, below the ordinary 
high water mark, by the construction of a municipal dam. The city argued 
that because the dam was designed to improve the navigability of the stream, 
they had no duty to compensate the injured riparian. The court rejected 
this argument after examining the purpose of the dam and concluded "a 
154 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W,2d 255 (1936). 
155 95 S.W.2d at 259. 
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purpose to create a pool navigable by small craft only cannot 
be regarded as a purpose to improve navigation" and thus "there is a 
clear case for the enforcement of the constitutional guarantee ccmpen-
sation" •156 There is ample precedent for denying compensation but the 
result is a good one. It distinguishes between the use of the ~er to 
validate the activity but not to deny compensation. The real question 
the court should ask is, what incidents of property ownership should 
the owner be entitled to rely on receiving compensation if they are 
destroyed pursuant to an exercise of the power? Kentucky h3.s taken this 
approach in a recent case arising from the improvement of the short of 
157 Barkeley Lake. Plaintiff owned a parcel with water access to the lake 
and a small portion was taken by the state for a right of way. This 
severed access by water from the main tract to an inlet which led to 
the lake but the state refused to allow c~ensation for the loss. The 
court reviewed the navigation cases and found cases denying and granting 
c~nsation for loss of access and decided to take a fresh look at the 
problem and allowed recovery. The court found precedent in Natcher but 
based its opinion principally on the effect denial of ccmpensation would 
have on the state's recreational development. 
"Let us keep in mind that the riparian rights of the land owned 
by appellees were created by the U.S. Government in the construction 
of Barkley Lake and the impounding of the water of the Ct.nnberland River 
156Ibid. 
157Department of Highways v. Thomas_ S.W.2d 
(opinion not reported at time of writing). 
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above the dam. It is simple logic that as soon as it became generally 
known that Barkley Dam was to be constructed and the high-water mark 
determined, appellee's property, like thousands of other acres of land 
adjoining artificial lakes in the Commonwealth, enjoyed a fantastic 
increase in value. The value is there; it is recognized by the buyer, 
the seller, and everyone else. 
I It occurs to this court that the question in this case has weighty 
public policy considerations. This Commonwealth has l!Dre miles of navi-
gable rivers than any other inland state in the Union (including the 
tortuous Cumberland, which raises its head in John Fox, Jr., country, 
the !IDUDtains of southeastern Kentucky, snakes its way south into the 
state of Tennessee before becoming homesick for its native land and 
str-eaking north to entirely embrace its l!Dther state before spending 
itself in the beautiful Ohio.) The construction of numerous multipurpose 
dams has provided the fair state of Kentucky with l!Dre miles of lake 
shore line than any other state, with the possible exception of Minnesota. 
(Approximately 6,000 miles of shore line, containing 180,000 acres of 
surface water, and llD!'e dams are being built.) Industry is moving into 
our State at an accelerated rate. The population is increasing. leisure 
time is also increasing with automation, resulting in greater demand for 
recreation. All of this tends to increase the value of land with access 
to our lakes. This court will not blindly disregard such obvious facts 
existing in this Comnonwealth in regard to value of land suitable for 
camp sites fronting on public lakes with recreational facilities, and 
. l . . . . ,,158 practically al of them enJoy such facilities. 
158Id. at 
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Access rights are a good instance where compensation should be granted 
when they are destroyed pursuant to an exercise of the navigation power 
because.the littoral or riparian owner should be induced to develop his 
property in reliance on the continued existence in order to encourage 
state recreational development of water access. Granting compensation 
will rot unduly interfere with public improvements and should be an 
expense which !IRlSt be added to the state's calculation of project costs. 
Ccmpensation for other rights which may be asserted is not so clear and 
the court !IRlSt pick and choose with care in defining compensable rights. 
· . . . . 159 For example, m Wood:!..· South River Dramage District a resort owner 
suffered a severe loss of business when a drainage district lowered the 
level of the water in the bay on which her resort was located. The court 
denied compensation because "The restriction appellant seeks to impose 
upon the free exercise by the supervisors of the powers entrusted to them 
for the public good might conceivably :impair and interfere with the effective 
reclamation of lands in the district." The court's attempt to balance pri-
vate against public interests is an unsatisfactory analysis and a better 
rationale might have been that plaintiff's reliance on the district main-
taining a minim.Jm lake level was unreasonable because its purpose was 
drainage. The same rationale vJOuld apply to compensation claims of property 
owners on the sro:res of flood control and water supply reservoirs but 
vJOuld be less persuasive if recreational use were the primary purpose 
of the facility. Hopefully the Court of Appeals will continue to decide 
conflicts involving the navigation servitude on a case by case basis 
examining such factors as justified reliance rather than invoking a blanket. 
rule of no compensation. 
159422 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1967). 
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If a watercourse is found non-navigable the exclusive right 
to use the water for recreational pill'.1)0ses belongs to the shoreland 
owners. At conm::m law the littoral owners had a right to enjoin diver-
sions which reduced the level of the lake below its nonnal levei. 160 
This application of the natural flow theory was rejected by some courts 
· · 161 
which held that conflicts should be settled by the reasonable use rule. 
This rule will not guarantee the littoral owners a minimum level although 
the leading case applying the theory enjoined diversions which would reduce 
the level below its normal height. It is probable that Kentucky would 
adopt the reasonable use standard but if KRS 151. 210(2), discussed earlier, 
is applied to fix minimum lake levels, littoral owners will be protected 
by public action rather than by common law doctrines because the recreational 
function of a lake should certainly be a factor for the division to con-
sider in fixing the minimum levels. 
A related problem is the scope of the littoral owner's right to 
use the surface of the lake. Early courts adopted the theory that the 
littoral owners rights were determined by ownership of the underlying soil. 
The court thus divided the lake into an imaginary pie and confined each 
1 . l . 162 ittora owner to his wedge. A recent Florida case rejected this rule 
on the theory that it was impractical and impeded the recreational develop-
ment of the state.163 Kentucky should follow the Florida Supreme Court 
for it makes little sense to attempt to confine users within imaginary 
160Taylor v. 
161... . 
tiarrlS V, 
Tampa Coal Co. 4-3 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 194-9L 
Brooks 225 Ark. 4-35, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955), 
162see ~·, Sanders v. De Roe, 207 Ind. 90 191 N.E. 331 (1934-). 
163Hill v. McLuffie, 196 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1967). 
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boundaries, The doctrine of reasonable use, of course, applies and 
excessive uses by any one littoral owner which substantially interferes 
with the enjoyment of others can be enjoined. A good example of the 
kinds of limitations a court could impose is illustrated by a recent 
Washington decision, Botton v. State.164 The state acquired the fee to 
a strip of littoral property to provide access for fishermen but other 
large public groups soon turned the small lake in a go-go resort area. 
The private littoral owners sued arguing that such public use was 
decreasing the value of their property and was beyond the scope of 
the original purpose for acquiring the fee. The court agreed and 
held that the state's failure to restrict use to the original purpose 
had become unreasonable in light of the small size of the lake and the 
adverse effect the expanded use had on the value of other littoral 
owner' s property. This reasonable use l:imi tation should apply equally 
to excessive use by a private littoral owner. 
Much of Kentucky's recreation potential may be lost if the state 
fails to central the development of the portion of the shore held in 
private ownership around the large multi-purpose reservoirs. Unregulated 
developnent will lead to a series of recreational slums attractive to no 
one. It is unrealistic to expect many units of local government to 
assume their responsibility in this area. 
one recently enacted by Wisconsin serves as 
164 
420 P.2d 352 (Wash. 1966). 
A state program is 
165 
a good rrodel. 
needed and 
The counties 
165Toe Wisconsin Statute is outlined in Yanggen and Kusler, 
Natural Resource Protection thruugh Shoreland Regulation: Wisconsin 
XLIV land Economics 73 (1968). 
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should be given a specified period of time to prepare sroreland 
protection ordinances. If the counties fail to act or fail to enact 
"reasonable minim.un standards" the state srould have the power to adop,t 
and enforce an ordinance.166 Minimum lot sizes, sanitation requirements, 
filling and grading, structural set backs, and Jil3.intenance of the 
habitat would be some of the problems which must be dealt with by the 
ordinances. This program should be complemented by a program to acquire 
scenic easements at crucial points along the srore to protect its environ-
mental integrity. 
166The state Jil3.Y delegate the zoning power to state agencies 
rather than cities or counties if it chooses. Southeastern Displays, 
lwc.v. Ward, 414 S.w.2d 573 (Ky. 1967). 
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Chapter XI 
CONCWSION 
This report has focused on the laws relating to the allocation 
of the state's water. As conflicts become acute it will be necessary 
fOI' the Division of Water to rrove fI'Om an info:rniation gathering and 
planning agency to a regulatory institution, As long as the Division 
confines its functions to the first category of activities it is unlikely 
that major pI'Oblems will be encountered in the operation of the statute. 
If, however, it assumes regulatory functions serious problems could be 
encountered for several reasons: 
(,1) The statute fails to clarify the relationship between the 
com= law of riparian rights and the permit system. 
( 2) The statute gives incomplete protection to the pI'OCedural 
rights of third parties and thus the statute is open to serious due 
process objections. 
(3) The status of prior consumptive rights is not clarified 
and serious constitutional problems are raised. 
(4) The statute contains unnecessarily broad exemptions such as 
the one for agricultural uses which could cripple its effectiveness. 
Nonetheless the statute is impcrtant because it should accustom 
Kentucky water users to the operation of a statewide regulatory system. 
It will allow the Department to collect the necessary data to formulate 
long range plans which can serve as the basis for a well reasoned set of 
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amendments when the necessity for them arises1 such as a system of priorities 
to operate during times of shortage. 
There are other water problems which also merit serious attention. 
There is a need to examine the rules governing liability for causing condi-
tions which result in the flooding of adjacent land. There is a need to 
analyze public programs to prevent flooding,such as flood plain zoning 
and the flood proofing of buildings. The control of water pollution is 
worthy of a separate study. The state is also plagued by the proliferation 
of small water districts which are often underfinanced and thus must com-
pete with cities for service areas on the unincorporated fringes of metro-
politan areas. This problem suggests the need to examine the laws governing 
the fornation and operation of the state's water distribution organizations. 
It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of Chapter 151. It 
is impossible to detennine if the establishment of a public administrative 
agency will work a substantial change in water use patterns or result in 
the rrore efficient use of the state's water resources. It is hoped that 
a follow-up to this study will be undertaken when sufficient experience 
under Chapter 151 has been accumulated to permit a meaningful evaluation 
of its effectiveness. 
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APPENDIX 
Commonwealth of Kentucky 
Department of Natural Resources 
DIVISION OF WATER 
Capitol Annex Building, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 
APPLICATION FOR WATER WITHDRAWAL PERMIT 
Page 1 of 3 pages 
(All information must be filled in to obtain permit - type or print) 
Check one: 
__ Municipality 
__ Water District·-------------------------------'(~C~o~r~p~o~r~a~t~e=-·N:,,:.a~m~e~) 
__ Industrial Plant 
__ Private Water Co·-------------------------------------
Telephone No. Address - Zip Code 
C Check one: 
__ Executive Officer~-----------------------------------
r Telephone No. Address - Zip Code 
Telephone No. Address - Zip Code 
[ List ::::o:e!:s!:r;o_n_t_a_c_t_e_d_, ___________________________ (~N~a~m~e,e_~a~n,,_d~T~i~t~l~ecL.) 
L Telephone No. Address - Zip Code 
Name of Consulting Engineer-----------------------------------
[
-, .. MARK U.S. Geological Survey 
following (if applicable): 
7\ Minute Topographical Map 
Location of Water Treatment 
for your area showing location of the 
Plant(s); Location of Wells you are 
using; Location of Water Intake Facility(s); Boundaries of Distribution System; Location of 
[ 
Effluent Discharge(s); Location and Capacity of any Water Impoundments. USGS 7\ Minute Topo-
. graphical Maps for your location can be obtained from the Kentucky Dept. of Commerce, New 
Capitol Annex Bldg., Frankfort, Kentucky 40601. Map plus postage plus sales tax totals 46 cents 
Rated Plant Capacity ____________ GPD Ave. Plant Output ~----------GPD 
Amount of Water Purchased __________ _,,.,M~a~x~·_.sG~P-"'-D 
[ If Purchased, from whom (.~E~xe.c.::.::.,'-"--"'~'--------------------------------
WATER USAGE: 
PRESENT 
L Average Daily Withdrawal _______________ GPD Max. Daily Withdrawal ___ GP! 
No. Customers Billed ~--------------Estimated Population Served------
L Type of Use: Domestic lo Industrial % Other % ~------- ---------- ---------
Describe Other, if used: 
L 
Type of Treatment: 
L 
Page 2 of 3 pages 
r
, Storage Facilities, Raw Water: 
(Show number, type, 
and capacity)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
EFFLUENT: 
Show GPD Returned to Each Effluent Location:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
r· 
What is the Quality of Effluent at each Location~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
[ FUTURE REQUIREMENTS: PROJECTED TO YEAR 
[~ Average Withdrawal GPD Maximum Summer Withdrawal GPD 
[' Estimated No. Population to be served Est. No. of Customers to be served 
[ When will Reqmts. Exceed Availability Do You Have a Plan to Provide Water Needed in the Future (,=E~x~p~l~a~i~n~)'--~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
List any.Water Districts who obtain all or part of their supply from your Water Treatment Plant 
I and show amounts furnished them in GPD. 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Page 3 of 3 pages 
SOURCE OF WATER: If you have more than one source, show each source separately. (Reproduce ~ this page and attach additional sheets to this application if necessary) 
Ground Water: 
Depth of We 11 ~~~~~ Diameter ~~~~~ Date Drilled~~~~~-
r 
OR 
Surface Water: 
Show Quantity Impounded (or Area and Average Depth)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I~ !~::hQ~::t~:~e:a:~t:~::::t!ns:::::~e GPO and Amounts you Request in your Permit, for each 
[ 
[ ' 
I 
[ 
[ 
I 
L 
Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
WITHDRAWN REQUESTED 
(NOTE: If there is a significant variation between GPO you show as Withdrawn and 
Requested, explain fully in your covering letter) 
L I do hereby certify that all of the foregoing statements are true and correct. 
L 
Date Signature of Authorized Applicant 
L 
